Naval/Maritime History 19th of April - Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History

Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
10 April 1943 - italian Trento-class heavy cruisers Trieste, while moored in La Maddalena, Sardinia, was bombed and sunk by American heavy bombers


Trieste was the second of two Trento-class heavy cruisers built for the Italian Regia Marina (Royal Navy). The ship was laid down in June 1925, was launched in October 1926, and was commissioned in December 1928. Trieste was very lightly armored, with only a 70 mm (2.8 in) thick armored belt, though she possessed a high speed and heavy armament of eight 203 mm (8.0 in) guns. Though nominally built under the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty, the two cruisers significantly exceeded the displacement limits imposed by the treaty. The ship spent the 1930s conducting training cruises in the Mediterranean Sea, participating in naval reviews held for foreign dignitaries, and serving as the flagship of the Cruiser Division. She also helped transport Italian volunteer troops that had been sent to Spain to fight in the Spanish Civil War return to Italy in 1938.

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The ship saw extensive action during World War II, including the battles of Cape Spartivento and Cape Matapan in November 1940 and March 1941, respectively. Trieste was also employed to escort convoys to supply Italian forces in North Africa; during one of these operations in November 1941, she was torpedoed by a British submarine. On 10 April 1943, while the ship was moored in La Maddalena, Sardinia, she was bombed and sunk by American heavy bombers. Her superstructure was cut away and she was refloated in 1950; the Spanish Navy purchased the hull in 1952, with plans to convert the vessel into a light aircraft carrier, though the plan came to nothing due to the growing costs of the project. She was ultimately broken up by 1959.


Design

Main article: Trento-class cruiser

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Line-drawing of the Trento class

Trieste was 196.96 meters (646 ft 2 in) long overall, with a beam of 20.6 m (67 ft 7 in) and a draft of 6.8 m (22 ft 4 in). She displaced 13,326 long tons (13,540 t) at full load, though her displacement was nominally within the 10,000-long-ton (10,000 t) restriction set in place by the Washington Naval Treaty. She had a crew of 723 officers and enlisted men, though during the war this increased to 781. Her power plant consisted of four Parsons steam turbines powered by twelve oil-fired Yarrow boilers, which were trunked into two funnels amidships. Her engines were rated at 150,000 shaft horsepower (110,000 kW) for a top speed of 36 knots (67 km/h; 41 mph), but on sea trials only reached 35.65 knots (66.02 km/h; 41.03 mph). That speed could only be reached on a very light displacement, and in service, her practical top speed was only 31 knots (57 km/h; 36 mph). The ship had a cruising range of 4,160 nautical miles (7,700 km; 4,790 mi) at a speed of 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph)

She was protected with an armored belt that was 70 mm (2.8 in) thick amidships with armored bulkheads 40 to 60 mm (1.6 to 2.4 in) thick on either end. Her armor deck was 50 mm (2.0 in) thick in the central portion of the ship and reduced to 20 mm (0.79 in) at either end. The gun turrets had 100 mm (3.9 in) thick plating on the faces and the supporting barbettes they sat in were 60 to 70 mm (2.4 to 2.8 in) thick. The main conning tower had 100 mm thick sides.

Trieste was armed with a main battery of eight 203 mm (8.0 in) Mod 24 50-caliber guns in four gun turrets. The turrets were arranged in superfiring pairs forward and aft. Anti-aircraft defense was provided by a battery of sixteen 100 mm (4 in) 47-cal. guns in twin mounts, four Vickers-Terni 40 mm/39 guns in single mounts and four 12.7 mm (0.50 in) guns. In addition to the gun armament, she carried eight 533 mm (21.0 in) torpedo tubes in four deck mounted twin launchers. She carried a pair of IMAM Ro.43 seaplanes for aerial reconnaissance; the hangar was located in under the forecastle and a fixed catapult was mounted on the centerline at the bow.

Trieste's secondary battery was revised several times during her career. The 100 mm guns were replaced with newer Mod 31 versions of the same caliber. In 1937–1938, the two aft-most 100 mm guns were removed, along with all four 12.7 mm machine guns; eight 37 mm (1.5 in) 54-cal. Breda M1932 guns and eight 13.2 mm (0.52 in) Breda M1931 machine guns, all in twin mounts, were installed in their place. In 1943, the ship received eight 20 mm (0.79 in) 65-cal. Breda M1940 guns in single mounts.

Service history

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Trieste early in her career

Trieste had her keel laid at the Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino shipyard in her namesake city on 22 June 1925. The completed hull was launched on 24 October 1926, a year before her sister Trento. After fitting-out work was completed, the ship was commissioned into the Italian fleet on 21 December 1928. On 16 May 1929 she joined Trento in the newly created Cruiser Division for a cruise in the northern Mediterranean Sea that lasted until 4 June. On 1 October, Trieste became the flagship of the 1st Squadron. In mid-1931, she entered the shipyard in La Spezia for an overhaul that included the replacement of her tripod foremast with a more stable five-legged version. On 6 and 7 July 1933, Trieste, Trento, and the four Zara-class cruisers held a naval review for the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in the Gulf of Naples. On 2 December 1933, Trieste, Trento, and the heavy cruiser Bolzano formed the 2nd Division of the 1st Squadron. The unit was renamed the 3rd Division in July 1934.

On 18 June 1935, Trieste temporarily relieved Trento as the divisional flagship. Mussolini took a short tour of Italian Libya from 10 to 12 March 1937, and Trieste was among the vessels to escort him. On 7 June, she took part in a major naval review held during the visit of German Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. The ship became the 2nd Squadron flagship on 15 February 1938. On 5 May, another naval review was held in the Gulf of Naples, this time for the state visit of German dictator Adolf Hitler. On 12 October 1938, Trieste steamed out of Messina with the 10th Destroyer Squadron, bound for Cadiz, Spain. There, they met four Italian merchant ships on 15 October, which embarked 10,000 members of the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (Corps of Volunteer Troops) that had been sent to support General Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War. The convoy left Cadiz on 16 October and arrived back in Naples on the 20th. On 17 May 1939, Trieste took part in another fleet review, this one for Prince Paul of Yugoslavia during his visit to Italy. From 5 to 19 June, Trieste joined the rest of the fleet in Livorno for the first celebration of Navy Day on 10 June. From October to December, the ship underwent a major refit, which included modifications to her armament and the installation of funnel caps.

World War II
On 10 June 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France, formally entering World War II. The heavy cruiser Pola replaced Trieste as the squadron flagship, which in turn became the flagship of the 3rd Division, which also included Trento and Bolzano. These four cruisers deployed north of Sicily to patrol for Allied vessels on Italy's first day of the war. On 31 August, the 3rd Division sortied to intercept the British convoy from Alexandria to Malta in Operation Hats, though the Italian fleet broke off the operation without encountering the merchant ships. Trieste arrived back in Taranto on 2 September. She was present there on the night of 11–12 November, when the British raided the port, and she emerged undamaged.

Trieste sortied with the fleet on 26 November in an attempt to intercept another convoy to Malta. The following morning, a reconnaissance floatplane from Bolzano located the British squadron. Shortly after 12:00, Italian reconnaissance reports informed the Italian fleet commander, Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni of the strength of the British fleet, and so he ordered his ships to disengage. By this time, Trieste and the other heavy cruisers had already begun engaging their British counterparts in the Battle of Cape Spartivento, and had scored two hits on the cruiser HMS Berwick, the second of which is credited to either Trieste or Trento. The battlecruiser HMS Renown intervened, and quickly straddled Trieste twice, though she inflicted only splinter damage. This forced Campioni to commit the battleship Vittorio Veneto, which in turn forced the British cruisers to break off the action, allowing both sides to disengage.

On 9 February 1941, Trieste sortied with the rest of the 2nd Squadron to search for Force H after the latter had shelled Genoa; the Italians returned to port without success. On 12–13 March, Trieste escorted a fast convoy to North Africa.

Battle of Cape Matapan
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Map showing the movements of the Italian and British fleets
Main article: Battle of Cape Matapan

On 27 March, the division sortied with the rest of the fleet for a major sweep toward the island of Crete. During the operation, Trieste flew the flag of Rear Admiral Luigi Sansonetti. At 06:55 on the 28th, an IMAM Ro.43 floatplane launched by Vittorio Veneto located a British cruiser squadron, and by 07:55, Trento and the 3rd Division had come within visual range. Seventeen minutes later, the Italian cruisers opened fire from a range of 24,000 yd (22,000 m), initiating the first phase of the Battle of Cape Matapan; in the span of the next forty minutes, Trieste fired a total of 132 armor-piercing shells, though trouble with her rangefinders and the extreme range of the action prevented her from scoring any significant hits.

At 08:55, the Italian fleet commander, Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino instructed Sansonetti to break off the action with the British cruisers and turn northwest, to lure the British vessels into range for Vittorio Veneto. By about 11:00, Vittorio Veneto had closed the distance enough to open fire, prompting Sansonetti to turn his three cruisers back to join the fight. The 6-inch-gun-armed British cruisers were outmatched both by the Italian heavy cruisers and Vittorio Veneto, and they quickly reversed course. While the two sides were still maneuvering, a group of British torpedo bombers from Crete arrived and unsuccessfully attacked Trieste and the rest of her division shortly after 12:00. Further attacks from the aircraft carrier HMS Formidable convinced Iachino to break off the action and withdraw at 12:20.

Later in the day, Vittorio Veneto and Pola were torpedoed by British aircraft, the latter left immobilized. Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano were also attacked by aircraft, but they escaped without damage. Trieste reached Taranto in company with the damaged Vittorio Veneto at 15:30 the following day. in the meantime, Pola and two other Zara-class cruisers were destroyed in the night action with British battleships late on the 28th.

Convoy operations
From 24 to 30 April, Trieste and Bolzano escorted a convoy to North Africa. A combination of heavy seas and the presence of British warships forced the convoy to shelter in Palermo, Messina, and Augusta in Sicily before being able to make the crossing to Tripoli. A month later, the two cruisers covered another convoy; for the return leg of the voyage, the ships joined a second convoy also returning to Italy. Another convoy made the crossing on 8–9 June, again escorted by Trieste and Bolzano, along with the destroyers Corazziere, Ascari, and Lanciere. Trieste and the heavy cruiser Gorizia and the vessels of the 12th Destroyer Squadron covered four ocean liners that had been converted into troopships on 25 June; heavy British air attacks that night forced the convoy to return to Taranto. A second attempt was made on 27 June, and the ships successfully reached Tripoli on the morning of the 29th. Heavy air attacks targeted the ships while they were unloading the following day, but the ships were able to complete the task, depart that day, and reach Taranto on 1 July.

From 16 to 20 July, Trieste, Bolzano, Ascari, Corazziere, and the destroyer Carabiniere covered another fast convoy to Tripoli. On 22 August, Trieste sortied with other elements of the Italian fleet to try to locate Force H; they returned to port four days later empty handed. In late September, the British sent another convoy to reinforce Malta, codenamed Operation Halberd; the Italian fleet sortied on 26 September to try to intercept it, but broke off the operation upon discovering the strength of the British escort force. Trieste took part in the Duisberg convoy on 8–9 November along with Trento, the two ships serving as the convoy's covering force. The convoy was attacked by British warships in the early hours of 9 November, though the covering force failed to intervene and the convoy was destroyed.

Trieste escorted another convoy to Libya on 21 November in company with the light cruiser Duca degli Abruzzi. Late that evening, the convoy came under a combined submarine and aircraft attack; at 23:12, Trieste was torpedoed by the submarine HMS Utmost, and a torpedo bomber hit Duca degli Abruzzi shortly thereafter. The two damaged vessels were escorted back to Messina by the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi and the destroyer Bersagliere, arriving at around 08:00 the next morning. After repairs were completed, Trieste joined Bolzano and Gorizia—the only other surviving heavy cruisers in the fleet—in the reorganized 3rd Division. The ships sortied with eight destroyers on 12 August 1942 to try to intercept a British convoy; while on the operation, Bolzano and one of the destroyers were torpedoed by a British submarine, forcing the cancellation of the mission.

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Fate
On 10 April 1943, while moored in La Maddalena, Sardinia, Trieste came under attack from B-24 Liberator heavy bombers from the United States Army Air Forces. She received several hits at 13:45, and at 16:13 she capsized to starboard and sank in the shallow water. Casualties were relatively light, with 66 men killed or missing—of those, three were officers, eight were non-commissioned officers, and fifty-five were enlisted sailors—and 66 wounded—eight NCOs and fifty-eight sailors. The ship remained on the naval register until 18 October 1946, when she was formally stricken. Salvage operations began in 1950, starting with the removal of the ship's superstructure. The hull was then made watertight, was refloated, still capsized, and was towed to La Spezia. There, the ship was righted, and upon inspection, the shipyard workers discovered that fuel oil that had leaked into the engine rooms had preserved the machinery. The Spanish Navy purchased the hull and towed it to Cartagena and then to Ferrol in 1952 to convert Trieste into a light aircraft carrier. The cost of the project proved to be prohibitive, and in 1956 the Spanish Navy sold the vessel for scrap; the ship was broken up by 1959.

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http://conlapelleappesaaunchiodo.blogspot.com/2014/07/trieste.html
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
10 April 1963 - nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Thresher (SSN-593) that sank on deep-diving tests about 220 nautical miles (410 km) east of Boston, Massachusetts.
129 people died including commanding officer and 17 civilian technicians




The second USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the lead boat of her class of nuclear-powered attack submarines in the United States Navy. She was the U.S. Navy's second submarine to be named after the thresher shark.

On 10 April 1963, Thresher sank during deep-diving tests about 220 miles (350 km) east of Boston, Massachusetts, killing all 129 crew and shipyard personnel aboard in the deadliest submarine disaster ever. Her loss was a watershed for the U.S. Navy, leading to the implementation of a rigorous submarine safety program known as SUBSAFE. The first nuclear submarine lost at sea, Thresher was also the first of only two submarines that killed more than 100 people aboard; the other was the Russian Kursk, which sank with 118 aboard in 2000.

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Significance of design and loss
At the time she was built, Thresher was the fastest (matching the smaller, contemporary Skipjack class) and quietest submarine in the world. She was also considered the most advanced weapons system of her day. Created specifically to find and destroy Soviet submarines, the ship boasted a new sonar system whose passive and active modes could detect other vessels at greater range, and she was intended to launch the U.S. Navy's newest anti-submarine missile, the SUBROC. Shortly after her loss, the Commander of Submarine Force Atlantic wrote in the March 1964 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute's monthly journal Proceedings that "the Navy had depended upon this performance to the extent that it had asked for and received authority to build 14 of these ships, as well as an additional 11 submarines with very much the same characteristics. This was the first time since World War II that we had considered our design sufficiently advanced to embark upon construction of a large class of general-purpose attack submarines."

Following Navy tradition, this class of subs was originally named Thresher after the lead boat. When Thresher was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 16 April 1963, the class name was changed to that of the second boat, Permit, and Thresher is now officially referred to as a Permit-class submarine. Having been "lost at sea," Thresher was not decommissioned by the U.S. Navy and remains on "Eternal Patrol."

Early career

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Thresher at sea on 24 July 1961

The contract to build Thresher was awarded to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on 15 January 1958, and her keel was laid on 28 May 1958. She was launched on 9 July 1960, was sponsored by Mrs. Mary B. Warder (wife of World War II skipper Frederick B. Warder), and was commissioned on 3 August 1961, Commander Dean L. Axene commanding.

Thresher conducted lengthy sea trials in the western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea areas in 1961–1962. These tests allowed a thorough evaluation of her many new and complex technological features and weapons. She took part in Nuclear Submarine Exercise (NUSUBEX) 3–61 off the northeastern coast of the United States from 18–24 September 1961.

On 18 October 1961, Thresher, in company with the diesel-electric submarine Cavalla, headed south on a 3-week test and training cruise to San Juan, Puerto Rico, arriving 2 November. Following customary procedure while in port, her reactor was shut down. Since no shore power connection was available in San Juan, the ship's backup diesel generator was used to carry the "hotel" electrical loads. Several hours later, the backup generator broke down and the electrical load was transferred to the ship's battery. As most of the battery power was needed to keep vital systems operating and to restart the reactor, lighting and air-conditioning were shut down. Without air-conditioning, temperature and humidity in the submarine rose, reaching 60 °C (140 °F) after about ten hours. The crew attempted to repair the diesel generator (four men would receive Navy Commendation Medals for their work that night). After it became apparent that the generator could not be fixed before the battery was depleted, the crew tried to restart the reactor, but the remaining battery charge was insufficient. The captain, returning to the ship from a shore function, arrived just after the battery ran down. The crew eventually borrowed cables from another ship in the harbor and connected them to the adjacent Cavalla, which started her diesels and provided enough power to allow Thresher to restart her reactor.

Thresher conducted further trials and fired test torpedoes before returning to Portsmouth on 29 November 1961. The boat remained in port through the end of the year, and spent the first two months of 1962 evaluating her sonar and Submarine Rocket (SUBROC) systems. In March, she participated in NUSUBEX 2–62 (an exercise designed to improve the tactical capabilities of nuclear submarines) and in antisubmarine warfare training with Task Group ALPHA.

Off Charleston, South Carolina, Thresher undertook operations supporting development of the SUBROC anti-submarine missile. She returned briefly to New England waters, after which she proceeded to Florida for more SUBROC tests. While moored at Port Canaveral, Florida, the submarine was accidentally struck by a tug which damaged one of her ballast tanks. After repairs at Groton, Connecticut, by the Electric Boat Company, Thresher went south for more tests and trials off Key West, Florida, then returned northward. The submarine entered Portsmouth Shipyard on 16 July 1962 to begin a scheduled 6-month post-shakedown availability to examine systems and make repairs and corrections as necessary. As is typical with a first-of-class boat, the work took longer than expected, lasting nearly 9 months. The ship was finally re-certified and undocked on 8 April 1963.

Sinking
On 9 April 1963, Thresher, commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Wesley Harvey, got underway from Portsmouth at 08:00 and rendezvoused with the submarine rescue ship Skylark at 11:00 to begin her initial post-overhaul dive trials, in an area some 190 nautical miles (220 miles; 350 kilometres) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. That afternoon Thresher conducted an initial trim dive test, surfaced and then performed a second dive to half test depth. She remained submerged overnight and re-established underwater communications with Skylark at 06:30 on 10 April to commence deep-dive trials. Following standard practice, Thresher slowly dove deeper as she traveled in circles under Skylark – to remain within communications distance – pausing every additional 100 feet (30 m) of depth to check the integrity of all systems. As Thresher neared her test depth, Skylark received garbled communications over underwater telephone indicating " ... minor difficulties, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow", and then a final even more garbled message that included the number "900". When Skylark received no further communication, surface observers gradually realized Thresher had sunk.

By mid-afternoon, 15 Navy ships were en route to the search area. At 18:30, the Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic, sent word to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to begin notifying next-of-kin – starting with Commander Harvey's wife, Irene Harvey – that Thresher was missing.

By morning on 11 April, all hope of finding Thresher was abandoned, and at 10:30 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral George W. Anderson Jr., went before the press corps at The Pentagon to announce that the submarine was lost with all hands. President John F. Kennedy ordered all flags to be flown at half-staff on 12–15 April in honor of the 129 lost submariners and shipyard personnel.

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US Navy ships circle in the vicinity of the site of Thresher's sinking on 15 April 1963

Search and recovery
The Navy quickly mounted an extensive underwater search using the oceanographic ship Mizar and other ships; they soon found shattered remains of Thresher's hull on the sea floor, some 8,400 ft (2,600 m) below the surface, in six major sections. Most of the debris had spread over an area of about 134,000 m2 (160,000 sq yd). The bathyscaphe Trieste, then in San Diego, California, was alerted on 11 April and loaded aboard the large landing ship Point Defiance and brought through the Panama Canal to Boston. Trieste was deployed for two series of dives on the debris field: the first series on 24–30 June, and the second series in late August/early September. It found and photographed major sections of Thresher, including the sail, sonar dome, bow section, engineering spaces section, operations spaces section, and the stern planes. One aspect of the search conducted that summer by Mizarinvolved the use of highly sensitive proton magnetometers furnished by the Instrument Division of Varian Associates, Palo Alto, California, and shipped aboard Mizar before her departure from Suitland, Maryland. The magnetometers were used in conjunction with underwater video cameras and suspended on the same electrical line used to tow the video cameras themselves. Sea-bottom photography of the wreck site taken in summer 1963 can be seen at the official US Navy history website.

Trieste's successor Trieste II incorporated parts of the original bathyscaphe and was completed in early 1964. The bathyscaphe was placed on board USNS Private Francis X. McGraw and also shipped, via the Panama Canal, to Boston. Additional operations were conducted at the loss site of Thresher that were commenced by the first Trieste the year before. Trieste II was Commanded by Lt Comdr. John B. Mooney, Jr., with co-pilot Lt. John H. Howland and Capt. Frank Andrews in an operation that recovered bits of wreckage of the lost Thresher, in September 1964. The groundbreaking deep submergence operations helped in the design and construction of other deep-diving submersibles which could be used in rescuing crews and recovering objects from submarines in distress below levels reachable by conventional methods.

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Overhead view of Thresher's upper rudder, photographed in October 1964 from a deep-sea vehicle deployed from USNS Mizar

Cause
Deep-sea photography, recovered artifacts, and an evaluation of her design and operational history permitted a Court of Inquiry to conclude Thresher had probably suffered the failure of a salt-water piping system joint which relied heavily on silver brazing instead of welding. Earlier tests using ultrasound equipment found potential problems with about 14% of the tested brazed joints, most of which were determined not to pose a risk significant enough to require a repair. High-pressure water spraying from a broken pipe joint may have shorted out one of the many electrical panels, causing a shutdown ("scram") of the reactor, which in turn caused loss of propulsion. The inability to blow the ballast tanks was later attributed to excessive moisture in the submarine's high-pressure air flasks, moisture which froze and plugged the flasks' flowpaths while passing through the valves. This was later simulated in dock-side tests on Thresher's sister sub, Tinosa. During a test to simulate blowing ballast at or near test depth, ice formed on strainers installed in valves; the flow of air lasted only a few seconds. Air dryers were later retrofitted to the high-pressure air compressors, beginning with Tinosa, to permit the emergency blow system to operate properly.

Subsequent study of SOSUS (sound surveillance system) data from the time of the incident has given rise to doubts of whether flooding preceded the reactor scram, as no sound of the high pressure water impacting the compartments of the submarine could be detected on instrument recordings from SOSUS at the time. Such flooding would have been a significant sonic event, and no evidence of that can be found in the recorded data.[

Submarines typically rely on speed and deck angle (angle of attack) rather than deballasting to surface; they are propelled at an angle towards the surface. Ballast tanks were almost never blown at depth, and doing so could cause the submarine to rocket to the surface out of control. Normal procedure was to drive the submarine to periscope depth, raise the periscope to verify the area was clear, then blow the tanks and surface the submarine.

At the time, reactor-plant operating procedures did not allow for a rapid reactor restart following a scram, or even the ability to use steam remaining in the secondary system to propel the submarine to the surface. After a scram, standard procedure was to isolate the main steam system, cutting off the flow of steam to the turbines providing propulsion and electricity. This was done to prevent an over-rapid cool-down of the reactor. Thresher's Reactor Control Officer, Lieutenant Raymond McCoole, was not at his station in the maneuvering room, or indeed on the boat, during the fatal dive. McCoole was at home caring for his wife who had been injured in a household accident – he had been all but ordered ashore by a sympathetic Commander Harvey. McCoole's trainee, Jim Henry, fresh from nuclear power school, probably followed standard operating procedures and gave the order to isolate the steam system after the scram, even though Thresher was at or slightly below its maximum depth. Once closed, the large steam system isolation valves could not be reopened quickly. Reflecting on the situation in later life, McCoole was sure he would have delayed shutting the valves, thus allowing the boat to "answer bells" and drive itself to the surface, despite the flooding in the engineering spaces. Admiral Rickover later changed the procedure, creating the "Fast Recovery Startup" procedure. The Fast Recovery Startup allows an immediate reactor restart and for steam to be withdrawn from the secondary system in limited quantities for several minutes following a scram.

In a dockside simulation of flooding in the engine room, held before Thresher sailed, it took the watch in charge 20 minutes to isolate a simulated leak in the auxiliary seawater system. At test depth with the reactor shut down, Thresher would not have had 20 minutes to recover. Even after isolating a short-circuit in the reactor controls, it would have taken nearly 10 minutes to restart the plant.

Thresher likely imploded at a depth of 1,300–2,000 ft (400–610 m).




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Per
mit-class_submarine
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
10 April 1968 – The TEV Wahine, a New Zealand ferry sinks in Wellington harbour due to a fierce storm - the strongest winds ever in Wellington. Out of the 734 people on board, fifty-three died.


TEV Wahine
was the second Union Steamship Company of New Zealand ferry to carry the name Wahine (TEV = Turbo-Electric Vessel). The first was TSS Wahine (1913–51). TEV Wahine was a twin-screw, turbo-electric, roll-on/roll-off passenger and vehicle ferry. She was launched at the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in Govan, Scotland, in 1965 and worked the New Zealand inter-island route between Wellington and Lyttelton from 1966. On 10 April 1968, near the end of a routine northbound overnight crossing from Lyttelton to Wellington, she was caught in a fierce storm stirred by Tropical Cyclone Giselle. She foundered after running aground on Barrett Reef and capsized and sank in the shallow waters near Steeple Rock at the mouth of Wellington Harbour. Of the 734 people on board, 53 people died from drowning, exposure to the elements, or from injuries sustained in the hurried evacuation and abandonment of the stricken vessel.

The wreck of Wahine is one of the better-known disasters in New Zealand's history, although there have been worse, with far greater loss of life. Radio and television captured the drama as it happened, within a short distance of shore of the eastern suburbs of Wellington, and flew film overseas for world news.

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TEV Wahine lists heavily to starboard as she sinks in Wellington Harbour on 10 April 1968.


Ship background
TEV Wahine was designed and built for the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand, and was one of many ferries that have linked New Zealand's North and South Islands. From 1875 ferries have plied Cook Strait and the Kaikoura coast ferrying passengers and cargo, making port at Wellington in the north and Lyttelton in the south. From 1933 the Union Company's Wellington – Lyttelton service was marketed as the "Steamer Express". The introduction of Wahine in 1966 enable the withdrawal of TEV Rangatira (1930–1967) from service in 1965 and TEV Hinemoa (1945–1971) in 1966 and the sale of both Rangatira and Hinemoain 1967.

Building Wahine
Wahine was built by the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in Govan, Glasgow, Scotland. Plans were made by the Union Company in 1961, and her keel was laid on 14 September 1964 as Hull No. 830. Built of steel, her hull was completed in ten months, and she was christened and launched on 14 July 1965 by the Union Company's director's wife. Her machinery, cargo spaces and passenger accommodations were installed in the following months and she was completed in May 1966. She left Greenock, Scotland for New Zealand on 18 June 1966 and arrived at Wellington on 24 July 1966; she sailed on her maiden voyage to Lyttelton one week later, on 1 August.

The dimensions were 488 feet (149 m) long, had a beam of 71 ft (22 m) and was 8,948 gross register tons (GRT). At the time Wahine was the Union Company's largest ship and one of the world's largest passenger ferries. The powerplant was turbo-electric transmission, with four boilers supplying steam to two turbo-alternators that drove the twin main propellers, gave a top speed of 22 knots (41 km/h) and the ship also had stern and bow thruster propellers to propel her sideways for easier berthing. She had stabilisers that halved the amount she rolled and the frequency with which she did so.

The hull was divided by 13 watertight bulkheads into 14 watertight compartments.

The lifeboat complement was eight large fibreglass lifeboats, two 26-foot (7.9 m) motor lifeboats each with a capacity of 50 people, six 31-foot (9.4 m) standard lifeboats each with a capacity of 99 people, and additionally 36 inflatable rafts, each with a capacity of 25 people.

Service
Wahine entered service on 1 August 1966 with her first sailing from Wellington replacing TEV Hinemoa (1947–1967). Between then and the end of the year she made 67 crossings to Lyttelton. From August 1966, TEV Wahine and TEV Maori (1953–1972) provided a two-ship regular overnight service between Wellington and Lyttleton, with one ship departing from each port each night and crossing during the night. The arrival of Wahine enabled Hinemoa to be withdrawn from service and TEV Rangatira (1931–1965) that last sailed on 14 December 1965 and Hinemoa were subsequently sold.

On a normal crossing Wahine crew complement was usually 126: in the deck department, the master, three officers, one radio operator and 19 sailors managed the overall operation; in the engine department, eight engineers, two electricians, one donkeyman and 12 general workers supervised the operation of the engines; in the victualing department, 60 stewards, seven stewardesses, five cooks and four pursers catered to the needs of the passengers.

On trips made during the day she could carry 1,050 passengers,[citation needed] on overnight crossings 927, in over 300 single-, two-, three- and four-berth cabins, with two dormitory-style cabins each sleeping 12 passengers. Common areas included a cafeteria, lounge, smoke room, gift shop, two enclosed promenades and open decks. Wahine had two vehicle decks with a combined capacity for more than 200 cars.

Final crossing
On the evening of 9 April 1968 she departed from Lyttelton for a routine overnight crossing, carrying 610 passengers and 123 crew.

Extreme weather conditions

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Track map of Cyclone Giselle

In the early morning of Wednesday, 10 April, two violent storms merged over Wellington, creating a single extratropical cyclone that was the worst recorded in New Zealand's history. Cyclone Giselle was heading south after causing much damage in the north of the North Island. It hit Wellington at the same time as another storm that had driven up the West Coast of the South Island from Antarctica. The winds in Wellington were the strongest ever recorded. At one point they reached 275 kilometres per hour (171 mph) and in one Wellington suburb alone ripped off the roofs of 98 houses. Three ambulances and a truck were blown onto their sides when they tried to go into the area to rescue injured people.

As the storms hit Wellington Harbour, Wahine was making her way out of Cook Strait on the last leg of her journey. Although there were weather warnings when she set out from Lyttelton, there was no indication that storms would be severe or any worse than those often experienced by vessels crossing the Cook Strait.

Aground in Wellington Harbour
At 0550 hrs, with winds gusting at between 100 kilometres per hour (62 mph) and 155 kilometres per hour (96 mph), Captain Hector Gordon Robertson decided to enter harbour. Twenty minutes later the winds had increased to 160 kilometres per hour (99 mph), and she lost her radar. A huge wave pushed her off course and in line with Barrett Reef. Robertson was unable to turn her back on course, and decided to keep turning around and back out to sea.

For 30 minutes she battled into the waves and wind, but by 0610 hrs she was not answering her helm and had lost control of her engines. At 0640 hrs she was driven onto the southern tip of Barrett Reef, near the harbour entrance less than a mile from shore. She drifted along the reef, shearing off her starboard propeller and gouging a large hole in her hull on the starboard side of the stern, beneath the waterline. Passengers were told that she was aground but there was no immediate danger. They were directed to don their lifejackets and report to their muster stations as a routine "precautionary measure".

The storm continued to grow more intense. The wind increased to over 250 kilometres per hour (160 mph) and she dragged her anchors and drifted into the harbour. At about 1100 hrs, close to the western shore at Seatoun, her anchors finally held. At about the same time the tug Tapuhi reached her and tried to attach a line and bring her in tow, but after 10 minutes the line broke. Other attempts failed, but the deputy harbourmaster, Captain Galloway, managed to climb aboard from the pilot boat.

Throughout the morning, the danger of the ship sinking seemed to pass as the vessel's location was in an area where the water depth did not exceed 10 meters (30 ft), and the crew's worst-case scenario was the clean-up once the vessel either arrived in Wellington or had grounded in shallower water. There was indication that the ship would even sail again that evening as usual, albeit later than scheduled while the damage done by the reef was repaired.

Disaster unfolding

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Looking east on a calm day over the entry of Wellington Harbour, where the disaster occurred.

At about 1315 hrs the combined effect of the tide and the storm swung Wahine around, providing a patch of clear water sheltered from the wind. As she suddenly listed further and reached the point of no return, Robertson gave the order to abandon ship. In an instance similar to what had occurred during the sinking of the Italian passenger liner Andrea Doria off the coast of New England in 1956, the severe starboard list left the four lifeboats on the port side useless: only the four on the starboard side could be launched.

The first starboard motor lifeboat, boat S1, capsized shortly after being launched. Those aboard were thrown into the water, and many were drowned in the rough sea, including two children and several elderly passengers. Survivor Shirley Hick, remembered for losing two of her three children in the disaster, recalled this event vividly, as her three-year-old daughter Alma had drowned in this lifeboat. Some managed to hold onto the overturned boat as it drifted across the harbour to the eastern shore, towards Eastbourne.

The three remaining standard lifeboats, which according to a number of survivors were severely overcrowded, did manage to reach shore. Lifeboat S2 reached Seatoun beach on the western side of the channel with about 70 passengers and crew, as did Lifeboat S4, which was severely overcrowded with over 100 people. Heavily overcrowded Lifeboat S3 landed on the beach near Eastbourne, about 3 miles (5 km) away on the opposite side of the channel.

Wahine launched her life rafts, but waves up to 6 metres (20 ft) high capsized some of them and many people were killed. She sank in 38 feet (12 m) of water. forcing hundreds of passengers and crew into the rough sea. When the weather cleared, the sight of her foundering in the harbour urged many vessels to race to the scene, including the ferry GMV Aramoana, tugs, fishing boats, yachts and small personal craft. They rescued hundreds of people. Over 200 passengers and crew reached the rocky shore of the east side of the channel, south of Eastbourne. As this area was desolate and unpopulated, many survivors were exposed to the elements for several hours while rescue teams tried to navigate the gravel road down the shoreline. It was here that a number of bodies were recovered.

At about 1430 hrs Wahine rolled completely onto her starboard side.

Some of the survivors reached the shore only to die of exhaustion or exposure. Fifty-one people died at the time, and two more died later from their injuries, 53 victims in all. Most of the victims were middle-aged or elderly, but included three children; they died from drowning, exposure or injuries from being battered on the rocks. Forty-six bodies were found; 566 passengers were safe, as were 110 crew, and six were missing.

Aftermath
Investigation
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Salvage operations under way two weeks after the disaster

Ten weeks after the disaster, a Court of Inquiry found errors of judgement had been made, but stressed that the conditions at the time had been difficult and dangerous. The free surface effect caused Wahine to capsize due to a build-up of water on the vehicle deck, although several specialist advisers to the inquiry believed that she had grounded a second time, taking on more water below decks.

The report of the inquiry stated that more lives would almost certainly have been lost if the order to abandon ship had been given earlier or later. The storm was so strong that rescue craft would not have been able to help passengers any earlier than about midday. Charges were brought against her officers but all were acquitted.

Early hopes that she could be salvaged were abandoned when the magnitude of structural damage became clear. As the wreck was a navigational hazard, preparations were made over the next year to refloat her and tow her into Cook Strait for scuttling. However a similar storm in 1969 broke up the wreck, and it was dismantled (partly by the Hikitia floating crane) where it lay.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEV_Wahine
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
10 April 1991 - the Italian ferry Moby Prince collided with the oil tanker Agip Abruzzo in Livorno harbour and caught fire, killing 140 of the 141 people aboard.


The Moby Prince disaster was a major naval accident resulting in 140 deaths. It occurred in the late evening of Wednesday 10 April 1991, in the harbor of Livorno, Italy. It is the worst disaster in the Italian merchant navy since World War II. It is also considered one of the two worst environmental disasters in Italian history, along with the explosion and loss of the tanker Amoco Milford Haven on the following day in an unrelated accident near Voltri.

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MV Moby Prince, a ferry owned by Navigazione Arcipelago Maddalenino (NAVARMA) Lines collided with the oil tanker Agip Abruzzo, sparking an extensive fire that ravaged the ship. The only survivor of the crew and passengers of the ferry was a young ship's boy, Alessio Bertrand from Naples. The other 140 on board were killed by the fire or toxic fumes.

On 28 May 1998 the ship's hull sunk while impounded in a dock in Livorno harbor; it was later refloated and sent to be scrapped in Turkey.


Vessel
MV Moby Prince was an Italian ferry owned by Navarma Lines (today Moby Lines). She was built in 1967 by the English shipyard Cammell Laird of Birkenhead as Koningin Juliana for ferry operator Stoomvaart Maatschappij Zeeland of the Netherlands, and was used on the Harwich to Hook of Holland route until 1984.

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Moby Prince at Bastia (August 1987)

Collision
At 22:03 on 10 April 1991 the Moby Prince left Livorno, heading to Olbia for a regular service, manned by a complement of 65 crew and 75 passengers. The ship was commanded by Ugo Chessa. While taking the usual dedicated route out of the harbor, the ferry's prow struck the Agip Abruzzo, which was standing at anchor, and sliced through its tank number 7. The tank was filled with 2,700 tons of Iranian light crude oil. At 22:25, the ferry's radio operator broadcast a Mayday from the portable VHF transmitter. He did not use the fixed radio set, since he was not at his post at the moment of the disaster, as was later confirmed by the location of his corpse.

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Fire
Some of the oil spread on the surface of the sea and caught fire, but the remainder was sprayed on to the Moby Prince by the impact. A raging fire quickly engulfed the ferry. The exact quantity of oil sprayed on the ferry was estimated in the subsequent trial at 100 to 300 tons. In the collision, the tanker got stuck to the ferry. The tanker commander ordered full power to the engines and managed to separate the ships, but unwittingly worsened the oil spill.

The deck of the Moby Prince was on fire, but the people aboard had some time to reach safety. The fire reached the ship's interior only after the two massive covers between the deck and the upper car compartment gave way under the intense heat. Once that happened, the fire spread to the prow engine room, slowed only by the fireproof doors. According to later surveys, the fire took over half an hour to reach the De Luxe hall, the ship's safe meeting point.

First response
Rescuers were alerted by repeated calls from the Agip Abruzzo, but the Mayday from the Moby Prince went unheard. The situation was unclear until 23:35 – over one hour after the collision – when the ferry's wreck was located. The crew of the Moby Prince had no time to cut power to the engines. The ship was left out of control and began circling away from the location of the collision, still engulfed in flames, as was the sea around her, making rescue even harder.

The crew mustered the passengers in the De Luxe hall in the ship's prow, relying on a quick rescue by the port authorities, whose base was just minutes away. The hall was equipped with fireproof doors and walls. The flames were fueled by the oil sprayed on the prow, but the wave of fire passed over and around the hall, igniting anything around it but leaving the hall and its occupants unscathed. The hall's safety features might have given a chance of rescue, but the rescue operators were slow to respond, because of miscommunication and confusion from the misunderstood disaster dynamics. By the time the crew understood that help was not coming quickly, the hall's surroundings were engulfed in flames and no escape route was available.

Post mortem examination of the victims revealed that many of them died of carbon monoxide poisoning, having survived (albeit unconscious) for hours after fire broke out. The thick black smoke from the oil and from the plastics of the ferry's fittings were aggravated by gases evaporating from the crude oil.

When the first wave of flames hit the command deck, the crew had to flee without disengaging the ferry's air conditioning system – the fans were still operating when the wreck was visited the following day, and it was found that the air circulation contributed to diffusing toxic gases and smoke in the rooms not directly affected by the fire.

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Mistakes in rescue operations
Rescue operations were slow and chaotic, and it was later proved that problems with the rescue constituted one of the major causes of death. At first, the rescue ships from Livorno centered their operations around the Agip Abruzzo, reaching the scene at 23:00 p.m. and saving all the crew of the tanker. The Mayday from the Moby Prince went unheard, too feeble and garbled for the Port Authority to understand.

Mayday ... Mayday ... Moby Prince ... Moby Prince ... We are in a collision ... We are on fire ... Firemen needed ... Mate, if you do not help us we will burn ... Mayday ... Mayday ...
— (Moby Prince radio operator call)
Commander Renato Superina of Agip Abruzzo communicated by radio with the rescuers at 22:36, declaring that the ship had struck a bettolina (a kind of small service boat used for refueling), misreporting the accident and asking the rescuers to hurry to the tanker, "without mistaking them for us". This error was later repeated by the radio operator of Agip Abruzzo: "looks like it was a bettolina striking us".

The Commander of the Port of Livorno, Admiral Sergio Albanese, rushed to the scene aboard the Coast Guard vessel CP250. As part of his duties he was in charge of coordinating the rescue activities. However, he's surprisingly silent and no orders from Admiral Albanese are reported by any officer involved in the rescue operation and his voice is never heard in the recordings of the VHF channels that night. Admiral Albanese position is quickly dismissed during the trial, raising questions on whether he rushed to the site to cover secret military operations by other unidentified ships.

First aid
The first to find the Moby Prince wreck (at 23:35, over an hour after the collision) were two tugboat operators, Mauro Valli and Walter Mattei, who managed to recover the only survivor, Alessio Bertrand, a ship's boy hanging from the stern railing.

Along with Valli and Mattei came Port Authority guard ship CP232. The tugboat operators repeatedly called for help, especially after Bertrand told them that many people were still in danger. Bertrand was put on board the guard ship, which stayed for over half an hour looking for survivors, but then headed back to the port since he needed medical attention. Valli and Mattei later reported that Bertrand said "there is no one to save anymore, they have all been burned to death".

Meanwhile, tugboats and firefighting ships were sent to the wreck and began cooling the hull. At 03:30 sailor Giovanni Veneruso, from a private tugboat, volunteered to board the ferry to attach a towline, the first rescuer to board the ship after the disaster. Other rescuers reached the ship only hours later, in the morning, when the fire on the wreck was extinguished.

Corpse on the deck
A Carabinieri helicopter left its base early in the morning to join the rescue operations, and filmed a corpse lying on its back near the ship's stern. The corpse was not charred, even though the surroundings were deeply scorched by the flames. Later, when the wreck was returned to Livorno harbor, firemen found the body completely burned by the heat, suggesting that many people did not die quickly in the flames, but slowly from the intense heat and suffocation. This opinion was thoroughly discussed in the trial. Some experts asserted that the corpse on the deck was a passenger who, after surviving the fire and suffocation, tried to reach the rescue ship at dawn, but was overcome by heat from the deck's metal.

In September 1992 a videotape filmed by a passenger shortly before the collision was found in good shape, confirming that the flames and heat were quite tolerable where the passengers were sheltered, and a quicker rescue operation could have saved many lives.

Fate of hull
The charred hull was moored at Livorno until 17 May 1998, when she made water and sank. The rusty wreckage was later raised and towed to Aliağa, Turkey to be scrapped. The sinking of the Moby Prince was the worst disaster for the Italian merchant marine since the end of World War II.

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Causes
Fog
Among the officially accepted causes of the disaster, fog played the leading role. Judges confirmed that a natural phenomenon called advection fog (a quick buildup of thick fog in a small area caused by hot, moist air reaching the cold sea surface) was experienced that evening in the zone around the Agip Abruzzo, preventing the Moby Prince from spotting the tanker. Several qualified witnesses, including officers from the nearby Naval Academy, however, reported that visibility was good and no fog was present. Most of the witnesses referred to the smoke generated after the collision as "fog".

While this is one of the officially recognised causes of the disaster, many doubts were advanced as to whether the phenomenon had really occurred, especially after an amateur video found in the De Luxe hall was shown on TG1. In the video, weather conditions seem fair. Guardia di Finanza captain Cesare Gentile, commanding a guard ship which joined the first rescue efforts at 22:35, testified that "at the time, the weather was excellent, the sea was calm and visibility was perfect".

Traffic
A rumor that the United States and NATO military headquarters had radar reports and satellite photographs of the disaster received widespread attention, but was later denied by the respective commands.

The presence of the bettolina was never confirmed. The tanker commander in the early calls for help confirmed many times that the ship struck a small tugboat, grossly mistaking the real nature of the event. Those calls were undoubtedly influenced by the confusion from the collision and by low visibility caused by the smoke. Some sailors from Agip Abruzzo testified that they saw the silhouette of a ship in the fire, but only a few of them recognized that it could have been a ferry.

Three elements are thought to confirm the presence of a bettolina:

  • Tank number 6 of the Agip Abruzzo was not correctly sealed, as if it were being loaded or unloaded.
  • A length of pipe commonly used to refuel small boats was found, partly burned, near the tanker.
  • The record marked 11.30 p.m. from the diary of the captain of the Efdim Junior: "We learned that two ships, a passenger ferry and a tanker, had collided and that fire had broken out. I chose to stay at anchor because the great number of boats moving away from the burning ships and the many boats taking part in the search and rescue operations in zero visibility."
Against this theory there are mostly verbal witnesses, among them the harbor spotter Romero Ricci, pilot Federico Sgherri and many other officers from Agip Abruzzo, and harbor personnel.

Two bigger ships, probably the Cape Breton and Gallant II, both American, were riding at anchor near the Agip Abruzzo, as shown in a photograph taken from the Livorno seafront the afternoon before the tragedy. Captain Gentile gave an account about the position of the ships in the harbor after the collision:

I saw the silhouette of the Agip Abruzzo just outside the harbor, but not the Moby in flames. [...] I had a tanker to my left, about 700–800 meters from the Naval Academy. Then there was the tanker in that position. On the other side there were four ships, among them one perhaps carrying munitions; at the northern entrance, near the Calambrone, there was an illuminated American ship loading munitions.
— Cesare Gentile, Guardia di Finanza
In 2008, it was found that Theresa, another ship, had been present at the scene but her involvement remains unclear. A mysterious audio recording from 22:45, just after the collision, was discovered in 1991. It said in English: "This is Theresa, this is Theresa for the Ship One in Livorno anchorage I'm moving out, I'm moving out ..." No ship named Theresa was registered in the harbor records, and it is still unknown what is the "Ship One" referred in the recording.

Position of Agip Abruzzo
The real location of the Agip Abruzzo is debated. The ship's commander declared he was at anchor with the prow pointing south, but later revised his account. The tanker appeared to be heading south in the hours after the collision, as evidenced by a video recording found months after the disaster. It was never clarified if the collision was caused by the ferry going off course or if the tanker was mistakenly positioned in the "exit cone" of the harbor, where parking was strictly forbidden. The first position communicated by the Agip Abbruzzo Commander was recorded in the VHF transmission with the first mayday request. The voice of Commander Superina is clearly audible and reported a position inside the no-anchor-zone. Based on this initial declaration, the collision can be explained with the Agip Abruzzo being anchored wrongfully in the legitimate path of the Moby Prince. This may explain why Commander Superina's statements changed later on during the trial. The Captain Log which would have confirmed the correct position was surprisingly not immediately acquired and was lost few days later.

Human error
Blame was put on the crew of the Moby Prince for not using the radar equipment, for not following proper procedures for harbor maneuvering, and for speeding. The press wrongly reported that the crew was distracted by the UEFA Cup Winners' Cup football final between Juventus and Barcelona. This accusation was decisively refuted when Bertrand was interrogated and declared that the commanding officers were at the helm of the ferry, where they should be.

Trials
Immediately after the disaster, the Livorno public prosecutor began proceedings against unknown persons for failure to assist and culpable homicide. The first trial began on 29 November 1995: third officer Valentino Rolla of the Agip Abruzzo, acting commander of the tanker, was charged with multiple culpable homicide and arson; Angelo Cedro, deputy commander of the Port Authority, and guard officer Lorenzo Checcacci were charged with multiple culpable homicide for the lateness of the rescues; sailor Gianluigi Spartano was charged of culpable homicide for missing the ferry's Mayday. Charges against Achille Onorato, the owner of NAVARMA, and Agip Abruzzo commander Renato Superina were dropped.

The trial came to an end two years later, on the night of 31 October 1997, in a very tense atmosphere: in a courtroom full of police and carabinieri, jury president Germano Lamberti read out the verdict absolving all the accused. This verdict, however, was partially revised on appeal. The terza sezione penale (third criminal court) in Florence declared that further proceedings were not to be taken, because of a statute of limitations. In November 1997, 11 members of parliament proposed a new commission of inquiry.

In addition to the main trial, two separate cases were examined in the district court: Moby Prince first mate Ciro Di Lauro confessed to tampering with the rudder in the engine room of the scorched hull in order to set inquirers on the wrong track; and Pasquale D'Orsi, maintenance technician for NAVARMA, was accused by Lauro. They were both absolved of any offence in the trial and two appeals.

In 2006, at the request of Commander Chessa's sons, the Livorno public prosecutor opened a new inquiry into the disaster. New images of the disaster were found in the offices of the Livorno public prosecutor, confirming the presence of satellite reconnaissance of the area on the night of the collision. In 2009 the association of victims relatives asked president Giorgio Napolitano to ask Barack Obama to disclose the radar recordings, satellite images and any other information available to American authorities. In April 2009, parliamentarian Ermete Realacci called for a new inquiry into the alleged presence of other ships, especially of the US Navy, in the harbor on the night of the disaster.

On 16 November 2007 Fabio Piselli, a former army paratrooper, told the press of new information about the disaster that he had found while investigating the death of a relative working for the U.S. Embassy in Rome. He met with attorney Carlo Palermo, but was later allegedly attacked by four people who kidnapped him, shut him in the trunk of a car and set it on fire; however, he managed to escape. An inquiry into the incident was opened.

In 2009 Alessio Bertrand was interrogated again, and the seabed of the harbor was searched, yielding new evidence.

The floating hull remained impounded in the Livorno harbor. In 1998 it almost sank, but was raised and sent for scrap to Aliaga, Turkey.


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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moby_Prince_disaster
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
Other Events on 10 April


1746 Privateer Alexander (20) Cptn Phillips, cut out & recaptured Solebay (24) from St. Martin's road.

HMS Solebay
(1742) was a 20-gun sixth rate launched in 1742. She was captured by the French in 1744, recaptured by the British in 1746 and was sold into mercantile service in 1763.


1759 – Launch of Spanish Astuto (San Eustaquio) 58/60 (launched 10 April 1759 at Havana) - BU 1810


1769 HMS Endeavour, Lt. James Cook, arrived at Tahiti.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Cook


1777 - Lt. Horatio Nelson appointed to the frigate HMS Lowestoft and met on board Cuthbert Collingwood

In 1777, Collingwood first met Horatio Nelson when both served on the frigate HMS Lowestoffe. Two years later, Collingwood succeeded Nelson as Commander (20 June 1779) of the brig HMS Badger, and the next year he again succeeded Nelson as Post-Captain (22 March 1780) of HMS Hinchinbrook, a small frigate. Nelson had been the leader of a failed expedition to cross Central America from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean by navigating boats along the San Juan River, Lake Nicaragua and Lake Leon. Nelson was debilitated by disease and had to recover before being promoted to a larger vessel, and Collingwood succeeded him in command of the Hinchinbrook and brought the remainder of the expedition back to Jamaica.

pu5495.jpg
Depicts a confrontation between two British and two French naval ships. Cannon smoke hangs between the vessels. The French La Minerve, in the centre foreground, in port broadside view, has lost the top section of her mainmast and her entire foremast. Her bow is badly damaged with the bowsprit and figurehead gone. Figures can be seen crowding the deck. Behind La Minerve, passing on the opposite tack, the starboard stern quarter of a British naval vessel can be seen through the smoke. This vessel has lost her mizzen mast overboard, but is still carrying three courses of sails on her remaining masts and flying the Red Ensign on her main mast. On the right of the picture, further away, two vessels, one French, one British, both on the same tack, are seen in port stern quarter view exchanging cannon fire. Their sails are intact, but holed; otherwise, both vessels appear to be in better condition than those in the foreground. The scene depicts the capture of La Minerve by the British Dido and Lowestoffe off Toulon on 24th June 1795. The French L'Artemise was also involved in the action

j5966.jpg
Lines (ZAZ3034)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horatio_Nelson,_1st_Viscount_Nelson
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Lowestoffe_(1761)
https://collections.rmg.co.uk/colle...el-327154;browseBy=vessel;vesselFacetLetter=L


1780 – Launch of USS Saratoga was a sloop in the Continental Navy. She was the first ship to honor the historic Battle of Saratoga.

USS Saratoga
was a sloop in the Continental Navy. She was the first ship to honor the historic Battle of Saratoga. Having disappeared in 1781, her fate remains a mystery.
Saratoga was built at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania by Warton and Humphries. She was begun in December 1779 and launched on 10 April 1780. She weighed 150 tons, was 68’ long with a beam of 25'4" and a depth of hold of 12'. Her complement was 86 with an armament of sixteen 9-pounders and two 4-pounders.

098660201.jpg
This drawing by J. M. Caiella is based on conjecture as to the first Saratoga's appearance; no depiction exists in any form. This is based on the 25-ship British Swan class of 1766-80 that was well known to American shipbuilders. The Saratoga of "trim lines," was an austere warship and thus was most likely not fitted with quarter badges and had a painted rather than coppered hull.

http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/86/86602.htm


1794 Capture of the Saintes by British.

In 1794, France's National Convention, represented by Victor Hugues, tried to reconquer the islands but succeeded in occupying them only temporarily, pushed away by the powerful British vessel Queen Charlotte.

HMS Queen Charlotte was a 100-gun first-rate ship of the line of the Royal Navy, launched on 15 April 1790 at Chatham. She was built to the draught of Royal George designed by Sir Edward Hunt, though with a modified armament.
In 1794 Queen Charlotte was the flagship of Admiral Lord Howe at the Battle of the Glorious First of June, and in 1795 she took part in the Battle of Groix.

1280px-Loutherbourg-La_Victoire_de_Lord_Howe.jpg
Lord Howe's action, or the Glorious First of June by Philippe-Jacques de Loutherbourg, painted 1795, shows the two flagships engaged on 1 June 1794. Queen Charlotte is to the left and Montagne to the right.



1799 hired armed Convoy ship HMS Lord Mulgrave (26) wrecked on Arklow Bank, Irish Channel.

Lord Mulgrave was launched at Whitby in 1783. She had a mercantile career until 1793 when the Admiralty hired her to serve as an armed ship protecting convoys. She was wrecked in 1799.



1800 – Launch of Cumberland, launched in 1800 and sailed as a West Indiaman until 1807 or 1808 when she was sold to Enderbys.

Cumberland was launched in 1800 and sailed as a West Indiaman until 1807 or 1808 when she was sold to Enderbys. She then made five voyages as a South Seas whaler. Enderbys sold Cumberland and she proceeded to sail between England and Australia. In 1827 she sailed from Hobart and was never seen again. It later transpired that pirates had captured her off the Falkland Islands and killed her crew and passengers.



1800 – Launch of Travers was launched in 1800 as an East Indiaman.

Travers was launched in 1800 as an East Indiaman. She made four complete voyages as an "extra ship" for the British East India Company (EIC). She was wrecked near the end of the outward bound leg on her fifth voyage.

Wreck_of_the_Travers,_East-Indiaman,_on_a_Rock_near_Sunken_Island_RMG_PU6377.jpg
Wreck of the Travers, East-Indiaman, on a Rock near Sunken Island, Thomas Tegg, 27 May 1809



1804 HMS Wilhelmina (32), Cptn. Henry Lambert, engaged french privateer Psyche (36), Cptn. Trogoff in the Indian Ocean

Battling the Psyche
On 9 April 1804 Wilhelmina was escorting the country ship William Petrie to Trincomalee when she sighted a strange sail. The unknown ship was the 36-gun French privateer Psyche, under the command of Captain Trogoff.

Psyche outgunned Wilhelmina, which was armed en flûte. Nevertheless, Lambert sailed towards Psyche to give William Petrie a chance to escape.

Light winds meant that the engagement did not begin until 11 April, when both ships opened fire, exchanging broadsides and attempting to tack around to rake their opponent. After several hours fighting, Psyche broke off and fled. Both ships had sustained heavy damage, Wilhelmina to her masts and rigging, while Psyche was in a near-sinking condition. Wilhelmina had nine of her crew wounded, three mortally and six slightly, while Psyche lost ten killed and 32 wounded, 13 of them mortally. Wilhelmina put into port, while William Petrie also arrived safely at her destination.

Almost a year later, on 14 February 1805, Lambert, now Captain (Acting) of San Fiorenzo would meet Psyche, now a frigate of the French Navy, in battle off the Malabar Coast of India. Lambert was victorious in a sanguinary action that resulted in the British taking Psyche into service as HMS Psyche. In 1847 the Admiralty awarded the Naval General Service Medal with clasp "San Fiorenzo 14 Feby. 1805" to any still surviving claimants from the action

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Engraving of a painting of HMS Sirius capturing the Dutch ships Furie and Waakzaamheid, 24 October 1798, created 1 October 1816.

HMS Wilhelmina was a 32-gun fifth rate frigate of the Royal Navy. She was previously a Dutch ship and had been built in 1787 for the Dutch Republic as the Wilhelmina. She was renamed Furie in 1795, after the establishment of the Batavian Republic as a client state of the First French Empire. Like other Dutch ships at that time, she was pressed into service as part of French plans to support the Irish Rebellion of 1798 in the hope of destabilising Britain. The British captured her and the Dutch corvette Waakzaamheid in 1798 while the two were supporting French and Irish forces involved in the Irish Rebellion. The Royal Navy took both into service, with Furie regaining her original name. Sailing as HMS Wilhelmina, she spent the bulk of her later career in the East Indies, serving mostly as a troopship. Here she fought an unequal battle against a large French privateer, and succeeded in driving her off and protecting a merchant she was escorting. Wilhelmina was almost the ship that faced a superior French squadron at the Battle of Vizagapatam, but she was replaced beforehand by the larger HMS Centurion. She spent the rest of her days as a guardship in Penang, and was sold there in 1813.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Wilhelmina_(1798)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_frigate_Psyché_(1804)


1811 – Launch of General Graham at Hull. She made one voyage for the British East India Company (EIC) as an "extra" ship, i.e., under charter

General Graham was launched in 1811 at Hull. She made one voyage for the British East India Company (EIC) as an "extra" ship, i.e., under charter. She carried stores to New South Wales, and returned to England via China. She also made one voyage to Bengal as a licensed ship. Between 1829 and 1847 she made numerous voyages between Scotland and Canada carrying cargoes, but also some immigrants. Currently, she last appears in records in 1847.



1897 Birth of Miles Rutherford Browning (April 10, 1897 – September 29, 1954) was an officer in the United States Navy in the Atlantic during World War I and in the Pacific during World War II.

Miles Rutherford Browning (April 10, 1897 – September 29, 1954) was an officer in the United States Navy in the Atlantic during World War I and in the Pacific during World War II. A pioneer in the development of aircraft carrier combat operations concepts, he is noted for his aggressive aerial warfare tactics as a captain on the USS Enterprise during World War II. His citation for the Distinguished Service Medal states: "His judicious planning and brilliant execution was largely responsible for the rout of the enemy Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway." He is the grandfather of actor Chevy Chase.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_Browning


1925 – Launch of Kako (加古 重巡洋艦 Kako jūjun'yōkan) was the second vessel in the two-vessel Furutaka class of heavy cruisers in the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Kako (加古 重巡洋艦 Kako jūjun'yōkan) was the second vessel in the two-vessel Furutaka class of heavy cruisers in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The ship was named after the Kako River in Hyogo prefecture, Japan.

Japanese_cruiser_Furutaka_-_19260405.jpg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_cruiser_Kako
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Furutaka-class_cruiser


1929 – Launch of French Pluton was a fast minelaying cruiser built for the French Navy in the late 1920s.

Pluton was a fast minelaying cruiser built for the French Navy in the late 1920s. She was also able to carry 1,000 troops on her mine deck as a fast troop transport. Shortly after completion she was modified and became a gunnery training ship, replacing the elderly armored cruiser Gueydon. Shortly before the beginning of World War II, she reverted to her original role and most of the gunnery training equipment was removed. She was sent to Casablanca, in French Morocco, when the war began to lay a minefield, but the order was cancelled a day later and she was ordered to disembark her naval mines. She exploded while landing her still-fuzed mines on 13 September 1939.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_cruiser_Pluton


1940 - HMS Thistle (N24) was a T-class submarine of the Royal Navy. She was laid down by Vickers Armstrong, Barrow and launched in October 1938. She was sunk by the German submarine U-4 on 10 April 1940 near Skudenes.

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1941 - USS Niblack (DD 424) picks up three boatloads of survivors from Dutch freighter Saleier, which was sunk the previous day by a German U-boat. The destroyer detects a submarine preparing to attack and drives it off with a depth charge attack. This bloodless battle apparently was the first action between American and German forces in World War II

USS Niblack (DD-424)
, a Gleaves-class destroyer, is the only ship of the United States Navy to be named for Albert Parker Niblack. Niblack became the Director of Naval Intelligence 1 March 1919, and Naval Attache in London 6 August 1920. As Vice Admiral, he commanded U.S. Naval Forces in European waters 15 January 1921 to 17 June 1922.
Niblack was laid down 8 August 1938 by the Bath Iron Works Corp. Bath, Maine; launched 18 May 1940; sponsored by Mrs. Albert P. Niblack, widow of Vice Admiral Niblack; and commissioned 1 August 1940, Lieutenant Commander E. R. Durgin in command. On 10 April 1941 Niblack dropped depth charges aimed at a German U-boat, the first hostile action between American and German forces during the Second World War.

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1942 - USS Thresher (SS 200) torpedoes and sinks Japanese merchant cargo ship Maru six miles north of Oshima, near the entrance to Tokyo Bay, Honshu, Japan.



1944 - TBM bombers and FM-2s aircraft (VC 58) from USS Guadalcanal (CVE 60) sink German submarine U 68 off Madeira Island.



1990 10. April 1990 - Großbritannien: im Maschinenraum der französischen Kanalfähre "Reine Mathilde" bricht auf dem Weg vom französischen Caen zum englischen Hafen Portsmouth Feuer aus. Zwei Personen kommen auf dem mit 600 Passagieren besetzten Schiff ums Leben

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Reine_Mathilde
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1693 – Launch of HMS Sussex, an 80-gun third-rate ship of the line of the English Royal Navy, lost in a severe storm on 1 March 1694 off Gibraltar.


HMS Sussex
was an 80-gun third-rate ship of the line of the English Royal Navy, lost in a severe storm on 1 March 1694 off Gibraltar. On board were possibly 10 tons of gold coins. This could now be worth more than $500 million, including the bullion and antiquity values, making it one of the most valuable wrecks ever.

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HMS Sussex (80) model, third-rate, starboard broadside Source: U. S. Naval Academy Museum Multi-licence with GFDL & cc-by-sa-2.5 and older versions by the USNA Museum.

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HMS Sussex was launched at Chatham Dockyard on 11 April 1693, and was the pride of the Royal Navy. As the flagship of Admiral Sir Francis Wheler, she set sail from Portsmouth on 27 December 1693, escorting a fleet of 48 warships and 166 merchant ships to the Mediterranean.

'Nov. 22. Kensington. Instructions for Sir Francis Wheler, knight, commander-in-chief of a squadron fitted out for the Straits. As soon as you join the Spanish armada, pursuant to the instructions of the Lords of the Admiralty, you shall act as most advisable for the annoying of the French, and shall give the Duke of Savoy notice of your arrival in the Mediterranean; and in case he desire your co-operation in any design against the French, you shall use your best endeavours to bring the same to a happy issue. During your stay in the Mediterranean you are to correspond as frequently as you can with Viscount Galway, our envoy extraordinary to the Duke of Savoy; and, as far as may be consistent with the service you are employed in, to act according to the advices you shall receive from him.'
After a short stopover in Cadiz, the fleet entered the Mediterranean. On 27 February a violent storm hit the flotilla near the Strait of Gibraltar and in the early morning of the third day, HMS Sussex sank. All but two "Turks" of the 500 crew on board drowned, including Admiral Wheler, whose body, legend has it, was found on the eastern shore of the rock of Gibraltar in his night-shirt.

Due to the extent of the fatalities, it was not possible to establish the exact cause of the disaster, but it has been noted that 'the disaster seemed to confirm suspicions already voiced about the inherent instability of 80-gun ships with only two decks, such as the Sussex, and a third deck would be added for new ships of this armament.'

Besides HMS Sussex, 12 other ships of the fleet sank. There were approximately 1,200 casualties in total, in what remains one of the worst disasters in the history of the Royal Navy.


Treasure hunt
Between 1998 and 2001, the American Company Odyssey Marine Exploration searched for the Sussex and claimed that it had located the shipwreck at a depth of 800 metres.

In October 2002, Odyssey agreed to a deal with the ship's rightful owner, the British government, on a formula for sharing any potential spoils. Odyssey would get 80 percent of the proceeds up to $45 million, 50 percent from $45 million to $500 million and 40 percent above $500 million. The British government would get the rest.

The Americans were then poised to start the excavation in 2003, but it was delayed amid a raft of complaints from some archaeological quarters, denouncing it as a dangerous precedent for the "ransacking" of shipwrecks by private firms under the aegis of archaeological research.

Just as Odyssey was about to start an excavation, it was stopped by the Spanish authorities, in particular the government of Andalusia in January 2006.

In March 2007, Andalusia gave assent for the excavation to start with the condition that Spanish archeologists would take part in the excavation in order to ascertain that the shipwreck to be excavated is indeed the Sussex and not a Spanish galleon. On the same day, Odyssey Marine sent one of its survey vessels from Gibraltar, west of Cadiz to begin its Black Swan Project, which has resulted in Spain taking action against the company and cancelling its agreement to cooperate on the Sussex project.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Sussex_(1693)


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An interesting monographie - here the link to the Planset Review:

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https://shipsofscale.com/sosforums/...l-of-hms-sussex-1693-by-gilbert-mcardle.2225/



And the wonderful model built by our member Ramon, alias @ramonolivenza

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https://shipsofscale.com/sosforums/...-th-21-st-october-2018.2050/page-2#post-42867

 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1712 - Battle of Fladstrand - Danes under Knoff vs Swedes under Sjöblad


This inconclusive battle which took place on 11 April 1712 near Fladstrand, Jylland, between Swedish and Danish forces. It was part of the Great Northern War.

The Swedish fleet, under Sjöblad, consisted of 7 ships with 330 guns, and the Danish fleet, under Knoff, consisted of 5 ships with 158 guns. The battle lasted about 2 hours. Denmark suffered 44 casualties.

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Ships involved
Sweden (Sjöblad)

Fredrika 52
Kalmar 46
Stettin 46
Elfsborg 42
Warberg 42/52
Charlotte 38
Stenbock 36

Denmark (Knoff)
Fyen 52
Raae 30
Soridder 28
Leopard 24
Loss 24



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fladstrand
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1781 – Launch of HMS Africa, a 64-gun third-rate ship of the line of the Royal Navy, launched by Barnard at Deptford


HMS Africa
was a 64-gun third-rate ship of the line of the Royal Navy, launched by Barnard at Deptford on 11 April 1781.

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American War of Independence
During the American War of Independence, she was sent out to India in early 1782 as part of a squadron of five ships under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, arriving too late for the battles of that year. Africa never made it to America and remaining in India, taking part in the last battle of that war, at Cuddalore in 1783. She returned to England once news of the peace treaty arrived.

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Scale: 1:48. Plan showing the body plan, sheer lines, and longitudinal half-breadth for Inflexible (1780), and later for Africa (1781), Dictator (1783), and Sceptre (1781), all 64-gun Third Rate, two-deckers. The design was similar to the 74-gun Albion (1763). Signed by John Williams [Surveyor of the Navy, 1765-1784]


Napoleonic Wars
Africa was present at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 under the command of Captain Henry Digby. Having been separated from the main British fleet before the battle, the Africa arrived from a different direction without knowing the battle plan that Horatio Nelson had devised. As the rest of the fleet engaged the combined Franco-Spanish fleet in a pell-mell battle, Digby sailed the Africa down the line of enemy ships in a parallel fashion, exchanging broadsides.

Gunboat War
During the Gunboat War, Africa was under the command of Captain John Barrett. On 15 October 1808, Africa was escorting a convoy of 137 merchant ships in the Baltic, with the assistance of the bomb vessel Thunder and two gun-brigs. They left Karlskrona that day and on 20 October they anchored in the Øresundoff Malmö. At noon a flotilla of Danish gunboats was seen moving towards the convoy and Africa sailed to intercept them.[3] The flotilla consisted of 25 gunboats and seven armed launches, mounting some 70 heavy cannons and with an overall total of some 1600 men.[3] It was under the command of Commodore J.C. Krieger.

At 1:30 the wind died and Africa was immobilized. By 2:50pm the gunboats had stationed themselves off Africa's quarters, where few of her guns could fire, and opened fire. The battle continued until 6:45pm when with night closing in all firing ceased. Had daylight lasted another hour the Danes would probably have captured Africa.[3] As it was, she had lost 9 men killed and 51 wounded, including Barrett. She was so badly battered that she had to return to Karlskrona for refitting.[3] The convoy, however, managed to reach Britain.

In 1810 George Frederick Ryves commanded the Africa, in the Baltic, from which he brought home a large convoy, notwithstanding the severity of the weather and the violence of the gales.

John Houlton Marshall promoted to Commander on the ship at a ceremony held on 21 October 1810 to commemorate the Battle of Trafalgar.

War of 1812
Under the command of Captain John Bastard, Africa was part of Sir Philip Broke's squadron that pursued, but ultimately failed to catch, the USS Constitution early in the War of 1812.

Fate
Africa was broken up in May 1814 at Portsmouth.

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Scale: 1:48. Plan showing the framing profile (disposition) for Inflexible (1780), and later for Africa (1781), Dictator (1783), and Sceptre (1781), all 64-gun Third Rate, two-deckers


The Inflexible-class ships of the line were a class of four 64-gun third rates, designed for the Royal Navy by Sir Thomas Slade. The lines of this class were based heavily on Slade's earlier 74-gun Albion-class.

Ships
Builder: Barnard, Harwich
Ordered: 26 February 1777
Launched: 7 March 1780
Fate: Broken up, 1820
Builder: Barnard, Deptford
Ordered: 11 February 1778
Launched: 11 April 1781
Fate: Broken up, 1814
Builder: Batson, Limehouse
Ordered: 21 October 1778
Launched: 6 January 1783
Fate: Broken up, 1817
Builder: Randall, Rotherhithe
Ordered: 16 January 1779
Launched: 8 June 1781
Fate: Wrecked, 1799



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Africa_(1781)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflexible-class_ship_of_the_line
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1796 - Royal Navy HMS Révolutionnaire captured Gracieuse, a 32-gun Charmante-class frigate off Île d'Yeu and brought her into British service as HMS Unite.


Gracieuse was a 32-gun Charmante-class frigate of the French Navy. Renamed to Unité in 1793, she took part in the French Revolutionary Wars. The Royal Navy captured her in 1796 off Île d'Yeu and brought her into British service as HMS Unite. She was sold in 1802

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French service
Gracieuse was re-commissioned in Rochefort in April 1793 under captaine de vaisseau Chevillard. She transported troops between the Basque Roads and Sables-d'Olonne, and then returned to Rochefort. She transferred to the naval division on the coasts of the Vendée. There she escorted convoys between Brest and Bordeaux. Gracieuse took part in the War in the Vendée, capturing the British privateer Ellis on 11 July.

In September 1793 Gracieuse was renamed Unité. She was to be named Variante in April 1796, but the Royal Navy captured her before the name change took effect.

On 14 May 1794, Unité captured the ship-sloop HMS Alert after a short fight that left Alert with three men killed and nine wounded before Alert struck. The French Navy took Alert into service as Alerte.

Unité then undertook a crossing from Port Louis to Rochefort under commander Durand. On 13 April 1796 Indefatigable, under the command of Captain Sir Edward Pellew was in pursuit of a French frigate. Pellew signaled to his squadron mate HMS Révolutionnaire to sail to cut the frigate off from the shore. Revolutionnaire then captured Unite after having fired two broadsides into her. Unite had nine men killed and 11 wounded; Revolutionnaire had no casualties. The Royal Navy took the frigate into service as HMS Unite.


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British service
She was then captained by Ralph Willett Miller and Sir Charles Rowley.

On 9 October 1797 Unite captured the French Navy brig Decouverte, of 14 guns and 91 men. She was three days out of Nantes, on her way to Guadaloupe with secret dispatches that she managed to throw overboard before the British took possession of her. During the chase her crew threw 10 of her guns overboard in an attempt to lighten her. Decouverte arrived at Plymouth on 15 October.

On 4 March 1799 Unite and the sloop Gaiete left Portsmouth as escorts to a convoy for the West Indies.

Fate
Unite was paid off at Sheerness in April 1802. She was sold there in May 1802

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Scale 1:48. Plan showing the quater deck and forecastle, upper deck, lower deck, fore and aft platforms for for Unite (1796) a captured French Frigate fitted at Plymouth Dockyard prior to fitting as a 32-gun, Fifth Rate Frigate. Signed J. Marshall. (Master Shipwright)



Révolutionnaire (or Revolutionaire), was a 40-gun Seine-class frigate of the French Navy, launched in May 1794. The British captured her in October 1794 and she went on to serve with the Royal Navy until she was broken up in 1822. During this service HMS Revolutionnaire took part in numerous actions, including three for which the Admiralty would in 1847 award clasps to the Naval General Service Medal, and captured several privateers and merchant vessels.

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Portrait of Révolutionnaire in 1820, by Antoine Roux.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_frigate_Gracieuse_(1787)
https://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections.html#!csearch;searchTerm=unite_1796
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Révolutionnaire_(1794)
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1796 - french 80-gun ship of the line Ça Ira, ex Couronne. was destroyed in an accidental fire


The Couronne was an 80-gun ship of the line of the French Navy.

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Model of Couronne, on display at the Château de Brest.

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Career
Couronne was built at Brest, having been started in May 1781 and launched in August that year. She probably was built from the salvaged remains of her predecessor, Couronne, which had been accidentally burnt at the dockyard in April 1781. She had a refit at Toulon in 1784.

French Revolution
In 1792 she was renamed Ça Ira, in reference to the revolutionary anthem Ah! ça ira.

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Ça Ira fighting at the Battle of Genoa on 14 March 1795

On 14 March 1795, she took part in the Battle of Genoa under Captain Coudé, in which a French squadron, under Admiral Pierre Martin, was pursued off Alassio by a superior British fleet consisting of 15 ships of the line under Lord Hotham. During the chase, around 9:00, Ça Ira ran afoul of Victoire, losing her fore and main topmasts and falling back of the French squadron. The frigate HMS Inconstant under Captain Thomas Fremantle caught up and engaged Ça Ira; Vestale came to help, fired distant broadsides at Inconstantand took Ça Ira in tow. Ça Ira began a heavy fire on Inconstant which forced her to retreat. At 10:45, HMS Agamemnon under Captain Horatio Nelson caught up and opened fire, shortly aided by HMS Captain; the artillery duel continued for four hours until French ships came to support Ça Ira, compelling Agamemnon to retreat.

During the night, Vestale was relieved by the 74-gun Censeur in towing the now dismasted Ça Ira. In the morning, the British fleet had come in windward; HMS Captain caught up and engaged the two French ships, which battered her for 1 hour and 15 minutes, leaving her severely damaged, in distress, and eventually to be towed away from the action. HMS Bedford came to reinforce Captain, and had her rigging also severely damaged. The British fire had also reduced Ça Ira and Censeur to an almost helpless state. The main of the French fleet attempted to come to the rescue of her rear again and seize the opportunity of the battered state of the British vanguard, but the lack of wind, incompetent French gunnery, and opposition by HMS Illustrious and HMS Courageux prevented any effective action. Only the Duquesne intervened, and had to retreat after she sustained damage and casualties. Ça Ira and Censeur tried to fight but due to a false manoeuvre Ça Ira collided with Censeur; her rigging fell on Censeur, stranding both ships. As a favourable wind built up, the French squadron retreated, leaving Censeur and Ça Ira without hope of rescue. Men from Agamemnon boarded Ça Ira and captured her. Reduced to hulks, the French ships eventually struck. They were taken into Spezia Bay.

Late career
Ça Ira was commissioned in the Royal Navy, but in too battered a state to serve, she was used as a hospital hulk in Saint-Florent.

Ça Ira was destroyed on 11 April 1796 in an accidental fire; boats from other ships attempted to aid, but as the fire became out of control, Ça Ira was evacuated and brought away from the anchorage. She drifted and ran aground half a mile to the northward of the citadel and burnt to the water line. An inquiry subsequently concluded that the fire had been accidentally put on by a "bottle of combustible matter improperly kept in the carpenters cabin", and acquitted the officers from blame.

Archaeological discovery
In 1988, a 19th-century map was discovered, allowing the discovery of the wreck the following year, and its subsequent excavation. From 1990 to 1995, underwater archaeological survey was undertaken by Tech Sub, a non-profit organisation.

sistership
Vaisseau_français_le_Saint-Esprit_au_combat_en_1782.jpg
The Saint-Esprit in action. (Detail of an English painting of 1784)

The Saint-Esprit group was a type of three 80-gun ships of the line of the French Navy. They did not constitute a single class, as each was built to a separate design, but they each carried a standard ordnance amounting to 80 guns.

Builder: Brest
Ordered: 11 January 1762
Launched: 12 October 1765
Fate: Lost in storm on 26 january 1795
  • Languedoc Renamed Anti-fédéraliste and Victoire
Builder: Toulon
Ordered: 9 December 1761
Launched: 15 May 1766
Fate: Broken up in 1799 in Brest
Builder: Arsenal of Brest
Ordered: 1766
Launched: May 1768
Fate: Accidentally burnt at Brest in 1781. A replacement, Couronne was constructed from the salvaged remains. Renamed Ça Ira in 1792, this ship was captured by Britain on 14 March 1795, destroyed in an accidental fire on 11 April 1796

sistership
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The Languedoc, dismasted by the storm the night of the 12th, attacked by HMS Renown the afternoon of 13 August 1778



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_ship_Ça_Ira_(1781)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint-Esprit-class_ship_of_the_line
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1809 - Beginning of the Battle of the Basque Roads, also known as the Battle of Aix Roads (French: Bataille de l'île d'Aix)
was a major naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars, fought in the narrow Basque Roads at the mouth of the Charente River on the Biscay coast of France.

Part I


The Battle of the Basque Roads, also known as the Battle of Aix Roads (French: Bataille de l'île d'Aix, also Affaire des brûlots, rarely Bataille de la rade des Basques) was a major naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars, fought in the narrow Basque Roads at the mouth of the Charente River on the Biscay coast of France. The battle, which lasted from 11–24 April 1809, was unusual in that it pitted a hastily-assembled squadron of small and unorthodox British Royal Navy warships against the main strength of the French Atlantic Fleet, the circumstances dictated by the cramped, shallow coastal waters in which the battle was fought. The battle is also notorious for its controversial political aftermath in both Britain and France.

In February 1809 the French Atlantic Fleet, blockaded in Brest on the Breton coast by the British Channel Fleet, attempted to break out into the Atlantic and reinforce the garrison of Martinique. Sighted and chased by British blockade squadrons, the French were unable to escape the Bay of Biscay and eventually anchored in the Basque Roads, near the naval base of Rochefort. There they were kept under observation during March by the British fleet under the dour Admiral Lord Gambier. The Admiralty, desiring an attack on the French fleet, ordered Lord Cochrane, an outspoken and popular junior captain, to lead an attack, over the objections of a number of senior officers. Cochrane organised an inshore squadron of fireships and bomb vessels, including a converted frigate, and personally led this force into Basque Roads on the evening of 11 April.

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Destruction of the French Fleet in Basque Roads - Thomas Sutherland, after Thomas Whitcombe, 1817. NMM

The attack caused little direct damage, but in the narrow waters of the channel the fireships panicked the sailors of the French fleet and most of their ships grounded and were left immobile. Cochrane expected Gambier to follow his attack with the main fleet, which could then destroy the vulnerable French force, but Gambier refused. Cochrane continued the battle over the next several days, successfully destroying several French ships, but with little support from Gambier. This allowed most of the French fleet to refloat and retreat up the Charente to safety. Gambier recalled Cochrane on 14 April and sent him back to Britain, withdrawing most of the inshore squadron at the same time, although scattered fighting continued until 24 April. The increasingly marginalised French fleet was badly damaged and trapped in its home ports; several captains were court-martialed for cowardice and one was shot.

In Britain the battle was celebrated as a victory, but many in the Navy were dissatisfied with Gambier's behaviour and Cochrane used his position as a Member of Parliament to publicly protest Gambier's leadership. Incensed, Gambier requested a court-martial to disprove Cochrane's accusations and the admiral's political allies ensured that the jury was composed of his supporters. After bitter and argumentative proceedings Gambier was exonerated of any culpability for failings during the battle. Cochrane's naval career was ruined, although the irrepressible officer remained a prominent figure in Britain for decades to come. Historians have almost unanimously condemned Gambier for his failure to support Cochrane; even Napoleon opined that he was an "imbécile".

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Background
By 1809 the Royal Navy was dominant in the Atlantic. During the Trafalgar Campaign of 1805 and the Atlantic campaign of 1806 the French Atlantic Fleet had suffered severe losses and the survivors were trapped in the French Biscay ports under a close blockade from the British Channel Fleet. The largest French base was at Brest in Brittany, where the main body of the French fleet lay at anchor under the command of Contre-amiral Jean-Baptiste Willaumez, with smaller French detachments stationed at Lorient and Rochefort. These ports were under observation by the Channel Fleet, led off Brest by Admiral Lord Gambier. Gambier was an unpopular officer, whose reputation rested on being the first captain to break the French line at the Glorious First of June in 1794 in HMS Defence. Since then he had spent most of his career as an administrator at the Admiralty, earning the title Baron Gambier for his command of the fleet at the Bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. A strict Methodist, Gambier was nicknamed "Dismal Jimmy" by his men.

Willaumez's cruise
British superiority at sea allowed the Royal Navy to launch operations against the French Overseas Empire with impunity, in particular against the lucrative French colonies in the Caribbean. In late 1808, the French learned that a British invasion of Martinique was in preparation, and so orders were sent to Willaumez to take his fleet to sea, concentrate with the squadrons from Lorient and Rochefort and reinforce the island. With Gambier's fleet off Ushant Willaumez was powerless to act, and it was only when winter storms forced the blockade fleet to retreat into the Atlantic in February 1809 that the French admiral felt able to put to sea, passing southwards through the Raz de Sein at dawn on 22 February with eight ships of the line and two frigates. Gambier had left a single ship of the line, Captain Charles Paget's HMS Revenge to keep watch on Brest, and Paget observed the French movements at 09:00, correctly deducing Willaumez's next destination.

The blockade squadron off Lorient comprised the ships of the line HMS Theseus, HMS Triumph and HMS Valiant under Commodore John Poo Beresford, watching three ships in the harbour under Contre-amiral Amable Troude. At 15:15 Paget, who had lost sight of the French, reached the waters off Lorient and signaled a warning to Beresford. At 16:30, Beresford's squadron sighted Willaumez's fleet, tacking to the southeast. Willaumez ordered his second-in-command, Contre-amiral Antoine Louis de Gourdon to drive Beresford away and Gourdoun brought four ships around to chase the British squadron, with the remainder of the French fleet following more distantly. Beresford turned away to the northwest, thus clearing the route to Lorient. His objective achieved, Gourdan rejoined Willaumez and the fleet sailed inshore, anchoring near the island of Groix.

In the early morning of 23 February, Willaumez sent the dispatch schooner Magpye into Lorient with instructions for Troude to sail when possible and steer for the Pertuis d'Antioche near Rochefort, where the fleet was due to assemble. Willaumez then took his fleet southwards, followed from 09:00 by Beresford's squadron. The French fleet passed between Belle Île and Quiberon and then around Île d'Yeu, passing the Phares des Baleines on Île de Ré at 22:30. There the fleet was sighted by frigate HMS Amethyst under Captain Michael Seymour, the scout for the Rochefort blockade squadron of HMS Caesar, HMS Defiance and HMS Donegal under Rear-Admiral Robert Stopford, which was anchored off the Phare de Chassiron on Ile d'Oléron. Signal rockets from Amethyst alerted Stopford to Willaumez's presence and Stopford closed with Willaumez during the night but was not strong enough to oppose his entry into the Basque Roads at the mouth of the Charente River on the morning of 24 February.

Gambier's blockade
Assuming that the French fleet had sailed from Brest, Stopford sent the frigate HMS Naiad under Thomas Dundas to warn Gambier. The British commander had discovered the French fleet missing from its anchorage on 23 February and responded by sending eight ships under Rear-Admiral John Thomas Duckworth south to block any French attempt to enter the Mediterranean while Gambier turned his flagship, the 120-gun first rate HMS Caledonia, back to Plymouth for reinforcements. In the English Channel Naiad located Caledoniaand passed on Stopford's message. Gambier continued to Plymouth, collected four ships of the line anchored there, and immediately sailed back into the Bay of Biscay, joining Stopford on 7 March to form a fleet of 13 ships, later reduced to 11 after Defiance and Triumphwere detached.

Shortly after departing Stopford's squadron off the Basque Roads, Naiad had sighted three sail approaching from the north at 07:00 on 24 February. These were Italienne, Calypso and Cybèle; a French frigate squadron sent from Lorient by Troude, whose ships of the line had been delayed by unfavourable tides. The lighter frigates had put to sea without the battle squadron and sailed to join Willaumez the previous morning. Their passage had been observed by the British frigate HMS Amelia and the sloop HMS Doterel, which had shadowed the French during the night. To the south, Dundas had signaled Stopford and the admiral left Amethyst and HMS Emerald to observe the French fleet while he took his main squadron in pursuit of the French frigates. Trapped between the two British forces, French Commodore Pierre-Roch Jurien took his ships inshore under the batteries of Les Sables d'Olonne. Stopford followed the French into the anchorage and in the ensuing battle drove all three French ships ashore where they were damaged beyond repair.

Willaumez made no move to challenge Stopford or Gambier, although he had successfully united with the Rochefort squadron of three ships of the line, two frigates and an armed storeship, the captured British fourth rate ship Calcutta, commanded by Commodore Gilbert-Amable Faure. Together the French fleet, now numbering 11 ships of the line, withdrew from the relatively open Basque Roads anchorage into the narrow channel under the batteries of the Île-d'Aix known as the Aix Roads. These waters offered greater protection from the British fleet, but were also extremely hazardous; on 26 February, as the French manoeuvred into the shallower waters of their new anchorage the 74-gun Jean-Bart grounded on the Palles Shoal off Île Madame, and was wrecked. The channel in which Willaumez chose to position his fleet formed a strong defensive position: an assailant had to cross the open Basque Roads and advance past the long and dangerous Boyart Shoal hidden just below the surface. On entering the channel, an attacking force would then come under fire from fortified gun batteries on Île-d'Aix before finally encountering the French fleet. The anchorage had been successfully attacked before, such as during the Raid on Rochefort in 1757, but more recent efforts in 1803, and 1807 had ended in failure.

The developing stalemate saw activity on both sides of the bay. Among the French fleet there was dissatisfaction that Willaumez had not attacked Stopford when he enjoyed numerical superiority, taking the opportunity to break out of the anchorage and pursue his objectives in the Caribbean. Captain Jacques Bergeret was so incensed that he wrote a letter criticising Willaumez to the Minister of Marine Denis Decrès, and warning that the Aix Roads were highly vulnerable to British attack. Although Emperor Napoleon apparently shared Willaumez's opinion, Decrès removed and censured both Willaumez and Bergeret, replacing the admiral with Zacharie Allemand on 16 March. Word had arrived that a British expeditionary force had captured Martinique in late February, and so Allemand, lacking further instructions, prepared his defences.

The French position was strengthened with a heavy boom formed from chains and tree trunks laid between the Boyart shoal and Île-d'Aix. This boom measured 0.5 nautical miles (1,000 yd) long and 31.5 inches (80 cm) wide, weighted in place with 5 1/4 tons of anchors, and yet was installed so subtly that the British fleet did not observe it. More than 2,000 French conscripts were deployed on the Île-d'Aix, supporting batteries of 36-pounder long guns, although attempts to build a fort on the Boyart Shoal were identified, and on 1 April Amelia attacked the battery, drove off the construction crew and destroyed the half-finished fortification. Allemand also ordered his captains to take up a position known as a lignée endentée, in which his ships anchored to form a pair of alternating lines across the channel so that approaching warships could come under the combined fire of several ships at once, in effect crossing the T of any attempt to assault the position, with the frigates stationed between the fleet and the boom.

In the British fleet there was much debate about how to proceed against the French. Gambier was concerned that an attack by French fireships on his fleet anchored in the Basque Roads might cause considerable destruction, and consequently ordered his captains to prepare to withdraw from the blockade at short notice should such an operation be observed. He also wrote to the Admiralty in London recommending British fireships be prepared but cautioning that "it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt very hazardous, if not desperate". A number of officers in the fleet, in particular Rear-Admiral Eliab Harvey, volunteered to lead such an attack, but Gambier hesitated to act, failing to take soundings of the approaches or make any practical preparations for an assault.

Mulgrave's imperative

Lord Cochrane Peter Edward Stroehling, 1807, GAC

With Gambier vacillating in Basque Roads, First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Mulgrave interceded. Prime Minister Lord Portland's administration was concerned by the risk posed by the French fleet to the profits of the British colonies in the West Indies, and had determined that an attack must be made. Thus on 7 March ten fireships were ordered to be prepared. In considering who would be best suited to lead such an attack Mulgrave then made a highly controversial decision. On 11 March the frigate HMS Imperieuse anchored at Plymouth and a message instructed Captain Lord Cochrane to come straight to the Admiralty. Cochrane, eldest son of the Earl of Dundonald, was an aggressive and outspoken officer who had gained notoriety in 1801 when he captured the 32-gun Spanish privateer frigate Gamo with the 14-gun brig HMS Speedy. In the frigates HMS Pallas and Imperieuse he had caused havoc on the French and Spanish coasts with relentless attacks on coastal shipping and defences including, most relevantly, operations in the Rochefort area. He was also a highly active politician, elected as a Member of Parliament for Westminster in 1807 as a Radical, he advocated parliamentary reform and was a fierce critic of Portland's administration.

At his meeting with Mulgrave, Cochrane was asked to explain a plan of attack on Basque Roads which he had drawn up some years previously. Cochrane enthusiastically described his intention to use fireships and massive floating bombs to destroy a fleet anchored in the roads. When he had finished, Mulgrave announced that the plan was going ahead and that Cochrane was to command it. Cochrane was in poor health, and under no illusions about Mulgrave's intentions: should the attack fail Cochrane would be blamed and his political career damaged. In addition, Cochrane was also well aware of the fury this decision would provoke in the naval hierarchy; the appointment of a relatively junior officer in command of such an important operation was calculated to cause offense. Cochrane refused, even though Mulgrave pleaded that he had been the only officer to present a practical plan for attacking Allemand's fleet. Again Cochrane refused the command, but the following day Mulgrave issued a direct order: "My Lord you must go. The board cannot listen to further refusal or delay. Rejoin your frigate at once."

Cochrane returned to Imperieuse immediately and the frigate then sailed from Plymouth to join Gambier. The admiral had received direct orders from Mulgrave on 26 March ordering him to prepare for an attack, to which he sent two letters, one agreeing with the order and another disputing it on the grounds that the water was too shallow and the batteries on Île-d'Aix too dangerous. Gambier did not however learn of the leadership of the operation until Cochrane joined the fleet on 3 April and presented Mulgrave's orders to the admiral. The effect was dramatic; Harvey, one of Nelson's Band of Brothers who had fought at Trafalgar, launched into a furious tirade directed at Gambier, accusing him of incompetence and malicious conduct, comparing him unfavourably to Nelson and calling Cochrane's appointment an "insult to the fleet". Gambier dismissed Harvey, sending him and his 80-gun HMS Tonnant back to Britain in disgrace to face a court-martial, and then ordered Cochrane to begin preparations for the attack. Gambier also issued Cochrane with Methodist tracts to distribute to his crew. Cochrane ignored the order, but sent some of the tracts to his friend William Cobbett with a letter describing conditions with the fleet. Cobbett, a Radical journalist, wrote articles in response which later inflamed religious opinion in Britain against Cochrane during the scandal which followed the battle.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Basque_Roads
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1809 - Beginning of the Battle of the Basque Roads, also known as the Battle of Aix Roads (French: Bataille de l'île d'Aix)
Part II



Night attack

1024px-Battle_of_Basque_Roads_11_April.svg.png
Map illustrating the position of the anchored French fleet shortly before the British attack on the night of 11 April
See also: Order of battle at the Battle of the Basque Roads

Cochrane's plan
As the 18 fireships prepared in Britain by Mulgrave had not yet departed by the time of Cochrane's arrival with the fleet, the captain responding by converting his own over the following week. A number of chasse-marées carrying tar and resin perfect for this role had been captured by the blockade, and Cochrane requisitioned eight military transport ships from the fleet reserve for conversion using these materials. The frigate-storeship HMS Mediator was taken over to be the centrepiece of the attack force. These vessels were laden with explosives and combustible materials such as rum-soaked hay, and crewed by volunteers from the fleet. On three of the vessels Cochrane had loaded 1,500 barrels of gunpowder, topped by hundreds of artillery shells and thousands of grenades to create an explosion ship, a floating bomb of his own design intended to detonate right in the middle of the French line. During this process an attack by French boats on the fireships was driven off, with two British sailors killed and one wounded, and on 5 April Cochrane reconnoitered the approaches to Aix Roads, firing shots at the forts and fleet to gauge their responses. He subsequently wrote to Mulgrave suggesting that with an expeditionary force of 20,000 he could seize the defences overlooking the anchorage, sink blockships in the channel and thereby permanently deprive the French of one of their most important naval bases, although his letter was ignored.

On 6 April the bomb vessel HMS Aetna, equipped with a heavy mortar, arrived with William Congreve, inventor of a rocket artillery system which was to be used in the attack. It was followed by the first convoy of 12 fireships on 10 April, taking Cochrane's total to 24 fireships and explosion vessels to expend in his attack.[45] With these ships was a transport carrying thousands of Congreve rockets, which were strapped to the masts and yards of the fireships to fire in all directions as the ships burned. Due to Gambier's failure to scout the channel, Cochrane was apparently unaware of the existence of the boom, although historian James Henderson suggests he knew of it but failed to inform Gambier lest the cautious admiral abandon the entire operation. Cochrane was intending that his force, led by the heavy Mediator and the explosion vessels, would enter the anchorage during the night and sow confusion among the French fleet. It was hoped that in the chaos some of the French ships might be destroyed by fire and others driven on shore where a concerted attack by the British fleet would destroy or capture the remainder. Allemand could see the fireships under preparation in Basque Roads, and increased his defences by stationing 73 small boats along the boom to tow fireships onto the mud flats and away from the French fleet. He also ordered all the ships of the line to remove their sails and topmasts. This rendered them largely immobile but considerably less flammable. The frigates retained their rigging as they would be required to move in the event of a major attack.

His preparations complete, Cochrane ordered the attack for the evening of 11 April, although Gambier was reluctant to allow his sailors to support Cochrane in the operation, saying "if you choose to rush to self-destruction that is your own affair . . . but it is my duty to take care of the lives of others, and I will not place the crews of the fireships in palpable danger". Cochrane was furious and after a bitter argument Gambier relented and gave permission for the attack to go ahead. He stationed Imperieuse near the Boyart Shoal to the north of the boom, approximately 2.5 nautical miles (4.6 km) from the French fleet, supported by frigates HMS Aigle, HMS Unicorn and HMS Pallas. This force would collect the crews of the fireships as they abandoned their blazing charges and rowed back towards the British line, and sloops HMS Redpole and HMS Lyra were equipped as light ships to guide the fireships into the channel. With these ships were the schooner HMS Whiting and cutters Nimrud and King George, all converted into floating rocket batteries. Aetna and two brigs anchored north of the forts on Île-d'Aix, while frigate Emerald and five smaller warships were to launch a diversionary attack to the east of the island. Gambier, with the main body of the fleet, moved closer to the entrance to Aix Roads, eventually anchoring 9 nautical miles (17 km) distant; it has been suggested by one historian that he may have done so in order that he could retreat out to sea easily should the French fleet attempt to attack him in the aftermath of a failed fireship assault.

Fireships advance

Regulus_under_attack_by_British_fireships_August_11_1809.jpg
Régulus under attack by British fireships, during the evening of 11 April 1809. Louis-Philippe Crépin

As night approached it became clear that the wind, although blowing in the correct direction, was too strong to allow the fireships to be chained together in squadrons as planned, and each was instructed to operate independently. At 20:30, with the wind and tide in their favour and the night darker than expected, the fireships cut their anchor cables and began to silently sail towards the French fleet. Most of the volunteer crews ignited and abandoned their vessels too early, the blazing ships grounding long before even reaching the boom; one even threatened Imperieuse, which had to veer its anchor cable to avoid being destroyed. Other crews, including those on one of the explosion ships, lost control of their vessels and took no part in the attack. A few however, including the lead explosion ship under Cochrane's personal command, continued forward at speed, as the wind increased gradually. He was followed by the second surviving explosion vessel, on board of which was Midshipman Frederick Marryat. Cochrane delayed igniting his own ship to the last minute, and when he finally lit the fuses his escape was reportedly delayed in a search for the ship's dog. As a result, his boat was still inside the debris field when the ship exploded, although he escaped unharmed. Elsewhere, five British sailors were killed and six wounded in premature detonations. The explosion ships detonated near the French frigate Indienne at 21:30 and 21:40, although trapped by the boom they did little damage. Following them however was Mediator, which smashed a hole in the boom through which the few fireships surviving followed.

Allemand's boat crews were unable to influence the passage of Cochrane's flotilla as the sea was now too rough for them to operate in the channel, and the fireship crews consequently endured great difficulty returning to the British frigate line. The Aix Road was now a scene of "sublime horror": blazing fireships drifted randomly across the anchorage, some passing amid the great hulls of the French line. Shells from Aetna and thousands of rockets burst amid the confusion as the forts and all ships fired their guns at threats real and imagined; "a scene . . . peculiarly awful and sublime." The fireships reached the French frigate line at 21:45, as the frigates cut their anchor cables and retreated southeast down the channel. The blazing vessels then struck the French line; Régulus was hit, the crew desperately fending off the fireship for 15 minutes while the drifting ship of the line crashed into Tourville. Cassard was also badly hit, losing 20 men killed and wounded to a shot from a fireship, and several other French ships were badly damaged in the confusion.

At 22:00, while avoiding three drifting fireships, the overladen 120-gun flagship Océan ran aground and was badly scorched by a fireship which struck the stern. To prevent explosion the stopcocks were opened and the magazine flooded. As the crew wrestled with this threat, the drifting Tonnerre and Patriote loomed out of the darkness. Patriote turned away in time, but Tonnerre crashed into the starboard side of the flagship and caused considerable damage, although fortunately detached soon afterwards. Océan's crew then held the blazing ship alongside long enough that the drifters could escape before releasing the fireship to drift on shore. During this effort at least 50 men tumbled to their deaths in the fiery chasm between the ships as they tried to prevent the fire spreading on board.

Gambier hesitates
"This would have been the time to have destroyed them; but this favourable opportunity was neglected, which caused not a little murmuring among us, and was considered most unseamanlike by many experienced men in the fleet."
James Choyce, fireship volunteer

As dawn rose on 12 April, only Cassard and Foudroyant remained afloat, having drifted into the mouth of the Charente with the tide. The remainder, nine ships of the line, Calcutta and four frigates, were all beached along the mud and rocky shoals of the channel. Océan lay isolated on the mud within Aix Roads itself, with Ville de Varsovie and Aquilon grounded on rocks at Charenton 500 yards (460 m) away and Régulus and Jemmappes on softer ground nearby. To the north, Tonnerre had grounded hard near Île Madame and despite desperate efforts from the crew had already flooded and become a total wreck. Calcutta lay on the Palles Shoal near the remains of Jean-Bart and Patriote and Tourville had grounded close to the mouth of the Charente not far from the frigate Pallas. Elsewhere Indienne lay at Pointe Aiguille and Elbe and Hortense on the Fontanelles.

Regulus_stranded_on_the_shoals_of_Les_Palles_August_12_1809.jpg
Régulus stranded on the shoals of Les Palles, 12 April 1809. Louis-Philippe Crépin

Cochrane, now back on Imperieuse, immediately recognised that although no French ship had been directly destroyed by the attack, there was an opportunity to annihilate the French Atlantic fleet in a single morning. Grounded and vulnerable, the isolated French ships could be simply destroyed by a concerted conventional attack on the Aix Roads, with only the batteries and the two remaining ships afloat to offer resistance. At 05:48 he frantically signaled Gambier "Half the fleet could destroy the enemy". Gambier acknowledged this communication, but made no reply and gave no orders. As the French ships started to drift with the tide, Cochrane sent more signals: at 06:40 "Eleven on shore", at 07:40 "Only two afloat". Still there was no response from the distant British fleet. At 09:30 Cochrane signaled that "Enemy preparing to heave off" as the French crews began the laborious task of refloating their ships. Cochrane ordered further, sardonic, signals "Two sail of the line are enough" and "the frigates alone can destroy the enemy", although the first was never made as the signal officer judged that it would be received by Gambier as an insult, and the second was made but never recorded in Caledonia's logbook. At 09:35 Gambier ordered his fleet to weigh anchor and then rescinded the order, instead holding a conference on the flagship for all his captains. Finally the fleet sailed at 10:45, but at 11:30 Gambier ordered a halt after only 3 nautical miles (5.6 km), and the ships anchored once more near Île-d'Aix while the admiral conducted a conference with his captains. In doing so, Gambier conspicuously avoided making any signal which might indicate he intended an attack, even spelling out some long signals to avoid using the flag which meant "prepare for battle". His behaviour at this point has been described by historian Robert Harvey as "one of the most contemptible acts of any commander-in-chief in British naval history".

While Gambier hesitated, one by one the French ships which had grounded began to refloat, although several grounded again. As they had removed their topmasts before the attack, they had survived the groundings with less damage than might otherwise have been the case, and were easier to kedge off. Foudroyant and Cassard, fearing an attack by the British fleet, retreated up the Charente at 12:45 and both then grounded at Fouras. At 13:00, Cochrane, his impatience and fury rising, deliberately allowed Imperieuse to drift stern-first alone down the channel towards the French fleet, flying the signal "The enemy's ships are getting under sail", followed by "the enemy is superior to the chasing ship", and then at 13:45 "the ship is in distress, and requires to be assisted immediately". He later wrote "It was better to risk the frigate, or even my commission, than suffer a disgraceful termination to the expectations of the Admiralty". At 14:00 the frigate was within range of Calcutta and began a steady fire into the beached storeship, supported by Aetna and several of the sloops, which he ordered into position by the unexpected process of firing cannon in their direction until they had moved to the position he intended. Cochrane had forced Gambier's hand: despite his desire to avoid combat, the admiral could not allow one of his frigates to fight the entire French fleet single-handed, and reluctantly he instructed the large frigate HMS Indefatigable, the smaller Emerald, Unicorn, Aigle and Pallas and the ships of the line Valiant and Revenge, the latter now commanded by Captain Alexander Robert Kerr, to join with the inshore squadron, enter the Aix Roads and support Cochrane


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Basque_Roads
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1809 - Beginning of the Battle of the Basque Roads, also known as the Battle of Aix Roads (French: Bataille de l'île d'Aix)
Part III


Cochrane's fight


Map_Battle_of_Basques_Roads_1809.jpg
Full battle disposition and evolution of the battle

Gambier's reinforcements
British reinforcement entered Basque Roads at 15:20, just as the crew of Calcutta abandoned the ship, withdrawing across the shoal. Forming a line of battle, the British opened a heavy fire on the nearby, and still grounded, Ville de Varsouvie while Beagle, armed with heavy carronades, nosed close inshore and took up station across the bow of Aquilon and raked the French ship repeatedly. For two hours these immobile French ships were battered by the British line with little reply, until at 17:30 both raised Union flags as an indication that they had surrendered. Shortly afterwards the crew of the wrecked Tonnere abandoned their ship and set it on fire. The French ship was destroyed by a magazine explosion at 19:30, followed at 20:30 by Calcutta, which had been mistakenly set on fire by an over-enthusiastic British boarding party. The storeship was carrying a large quantity of munitions, reportedly worth over half a million pounds in value, and produced an enormous explosion. Most of the British ships had suffered only minor damage and casualties from fire from the gun batteries on Île-d'Aix, where Revengehad temporarily grounded during the night and suffered 18 casualties. The French losses were minor except on Ville de Varsouvie, which had taken about 100 casualties in the exchange.

Although Gambier had no intention of risking his fleet in the narrow waters of Basque Roads, he had permitted three more transports to be fitted out as fireships, and at 17:30 these were led into the anchorage by Stopford in Caesar, accompanied by Theseus and several launches equipped to fire Congreve rockets. At 19:40 however Caesar grounded on a shoal and remained stuck there until 22:30, close to Valiant, which had also grounded at low tide. At this point six surviving French ships; Océan, four of the line and the frigate Indienne, remained aground close to the mouth of the Charente, while the remainder of the fleet had escaped upriver to secure anchorages. During the night the wind blew from the land, rendering a fireship attack impractical, and so the British contented themselves with setting Ville de Varsouvie and Aquilon on fire, both ships determined by John Bligh on Valiant, over Cochrane's objections, to have been damaged beyond repair. During this operation, one of the new fireships was wrecked on a shoal. The weather was so bad that night that the planned attack with the remaining fireships was abandoned as unfeasible.

The sight of the burning wrecks in the night once again spread panic throughout the French fleet, the grounded ships opening a heavy fire on the scuttled ships in the assumption that they were fireships. Captain Lacaille of Tourville was so unnerved that he immediately ordered his crew to abandon ship and set it on fire. The evacuation was so hasty however that the fires did not spread effectively, and the following morning the ship was found to still be intact, the crew returning to their prematurely abandoned vessel. There they found that the ship's quartermaster Eugéne-Joseph-Romain Bourgeois had remained aboard, unconvinced by Lacaille's order, and had single-handedly driven off an attempt by a British boat to board and capture the ship. During the night about 30 sailors had joined him, keeping Touville in French hands until dawn came and the rest of the crew returned.

Battle continues
At 05:00 on 13 April Stopford gave the order for the inshore squadron to withdraw back to Gambier's fleet. Cochrane was again furious, and even suggested taking Imperieuse and Indefatigable on a desperate attack on the still-grounded Océan. Captain John Tremayne Rodd on the latter refused. Frustrated, Cochrane remained in the anchorage, joined by Pallas and the smaller vessels as the larger ships returned to more open waters. At 08:00 he ordered a renewed attack on the remaining grounded ships at the mouth of the Charente, and by 11:00 the small vessels were in position and opened fire on the French flagship.[86] Although Aetna's gun split, forcing her withdrawal, the barrage otherwise continued throughout the day, although to little effect. It was not until 16:00 when the battered Océan and Régulus, most of their stores thrown overboard, were able to safely retreat towards the mouth of the Charente.

During this engagement three small rocket ships reached Cochrane, whose frigate was becalmed too far from the action, from the main fleet. On board, Gambier had sent a two-part letter. The first part praised Cochrane's achievements thus far and urged Cochrane to renew the attack on Océan but indicated that Gambier felt success was unlikely. The second part, a private letter to the captain, permitting one further attack but then ordering him to withdraw that evening as Gambier wished to "send you to England as soon as possible". Cochrane replied to the first part of the letter, stating that he would renew the assault on the following day, and pointedly ignored the second. Cochrane later claimed that Gambier had ordered him directly to withdraw by signal from Caledonia, but there is no evidence that such a signal was made.

Cochrane withdraws

Regulus_stranded_in_the_mud_in_front_of_Fouras_under_attack_by_British_ships_August_1809.jpg
Régulus stranded in the mud in front of Fouras under attack by British ships, April 1809. Louis-Philippe Crépin

During the night the British did not renew the attack, and the following morning found that most of the French ships had successfully retreated up the Charente. Océan and Tourville remained accessible, both grounded anew near Foures, while a few other French ships could still be reached by long-range fire. At 09:00 Gambier made the definitive signal ordering Cochrane to withdraw directly and replacing him in command with George Wolfe on Aigle. Cochrane reluctantly returned to the fleet and had a furious meeting with Gambier, accusing the admiral of "extraordinary hesitation" and urging a new assault. Gambier refused to renew the attack and threatened that if Cochrane tried to blame Gambier for the incomplete victory he would be seen as "arrogantly claiming all the merit to yourself". Cochrane was immediately ordered to return to Britain, sailing on 15 April with Gambier's dispatches carried by Sir Harry Neale. Wolfe briefly renewed the attack during 14 April with a repaired Aetna, emptying the bomb vessel's ammunition reserves to little effect.

At 02:00 on 15 April Océan finally began to move again, reaching safety upriver by 03:30. Several other ships were exposed, but without a bomb vessel they lay beyond the range of the British fleet. The French sailors made significant efforts to retrieve these ships over the following days; on 16 April Indienne was deemed too damaged to be saved, abandoned, and set on fire. The frigate exploded at midday. The following day Foudroyant and Tourville reached safety, and only Régulus now remained vulnerable. For several days in severe gales and heavy rain the ship remained stranded in the mud while Wolfe worked to bring up newly arrived replacement bomb vessel HMS Thunder. An attack on 20 April failed after the gun spilt almost immediately, and a larger scale attack with both bomb vessels and smaller ships failed on 24 April. No further attempts were made to destroy Régulus, and on 29 April the ship was finally refloated and brought to safety in the Charente. On the same day Gambier finally abandoned his blockade of the river and sailed his fleet for England.


Photo made during my visit in October 2018 in Rochefort:

At the horicont the Fort Boayrd - view from the island Île-d'Aix

Exactly in this area was the battle


IMG_09231.jpg


https://shipsofscale.com/sosforums/...-th-21-st-october-2018.2050/page-8#post-45898


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Basque_Roads
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1809 - Beginning of the Battle of the Basque Roads, also known as the Battle of Aix Roads (French: Bataille de l'île d'Aix)
Part IV



Aftermath

Sternhold_and_Hopkins_at_Sea_or_a_Slave_out_of_Time.jpg
Sternhold and Hopkins at Sea; or a slave out of time. Charles Williams, 1809. NMM. A satirical print; Gambier is shown reading the Bible, ignoring Cochrane's request to pursue the French fleet.

See also: Court-martial of James, Lord Gambier

The battle was undoubtedly a victory for the British; three French ships of the line, a fourth-rate and a frigate were destroyed and much of the remainder of the Brest fleet badly damaged and requiring extensive repairs; Océan and Foudroyant were in a particularly poor state. French casualties in the engagement are not known with certainty, but are estimated at 150–200, while British losses were only 13 killed and 30 wounded. Allemand later wrote that most significant damage resulting from the battle was to the morale of the French fleet; he wrote that "the greater part are disheartened; every day I hear them lamenting their situation, and speaking in praise of their enemy." Another French commentator told a British officer that the French sailors "had now no security from the English in their harbours, and they expected we should next go into Brest and take out their fleet". No British ships suffered more than minor damage in the two weeks of combat, and the fleet could return to its blockade with the knowledge that the Brest fleet was neutralised for some time to come and confined to Rochefort, although a powerful squadron was still under construction at Rochefort, where the defences had been swiftly repaired. This was the last time during the Napoleonic Wars that a significant French fleet was able to put to sea from the Atlantic ports; historian Richard Woodman describes it as the "biggest scare from a break-out French fleet in the post-Trafalgar period." Without naval support, the French colonies in the Caribbean were isolated, blockaded, invaded and captured shortly afterwards.

Courts-martial
Almost as serious however were the legal ramifications of the battle. In both countries there was a storm of controversy; in France four captains faced courts-martial from 21 June on charges of having abandoned their ships too easily and failing to follow orders. The captain of Tonnerre was acquitted, the captain of Indienne was acquitted on the first charge but sentenced to three months house arrest for the second and the captain of Tourville was sentenced to two years in prison and to be dismissed the Navy for abandoning his ship prematurely. The captain of Calcutta, Jean-Baptiste Lafon, was convicted of abandoning his ship in the face of the enemy and sentenced to death on 8 September. The execution was carried out by firing squad on the deck of Océan the following day. Woodman considers that "these wretched officers paid the penalty for Willaumez's initial timidity." Allemand's defeat is often blamed on Napoleon's instructions before the battle, which mistakenly assumed that the Aix Roads were a safe anchorage.

In Britain, Cochrane arrived at Spithead on 21 April and news of the victory spread rapidly. The Times ran a dramatic account of the battle which presaged national celebrations, and the junior officers of the fleet engaged in the fireship attack were promoted, and presented with financial rewards, while James Wooldridge, captain of Mediator who had been terribly burned, was granted a gold medal and a presentation sword. In 1847 the Admiralty authorized the award of the Naval General Service Medal with clasp "Basque Roads 1809" to the 529 surviving claimants from the action.

Cochrane was initially celebrated for his achievement and made a Knight Companion of the Order of the Bath on 26 April. Shortly afterwards however he informed Lord Mulgrave that he intended to use his position as a member of parliament to oppose any effort to thank or reward Gambier for his part in the battle. Mulgrave immediately warned Gambier, who demanded a court-martial to investigate his behaviour. The court was convened on 26 July; the inquiry panel president was Admiral Sir Roger Curtis and his deputy was William Young, both friends of Gambier and political opponents of Cochrane. Over eight days witnesses were called and evidence presented, much of it misleading. Most seriously, the charts of Basque Roads supplied to the court had been drawn by officers from Gambier's ship and favoured Gambier's account of the action. Cochrane was questioned aggressively during his evidence and lost his temper, being repeatedly reprimanded. Ultimately Gambier was acquitted and awarded the thanks of Parliament, despite continuing determined opposition from Cochrane.

Gambier continued in command until 1811, and remained in service until his death in 1833. Cochrane was disgraced and refused further service, choosing semi-retirement to pursue his political ambitions. He was later implicated in the Great Stock Exchange Fraud of 1814, convicted and publicly disgraced. He resigned his commission and joined first the Chilean Navy and then the Brazilian Navy, before becoming commander of the Greek Navy during the Greek War of Independence. He was restored to the Royal Navy with a royal pardon in 1832 and died in 1860, shortly after publishing an autobiography which furiously castigated the participants in the events 51 years earlier.

Historical assessment
Blame for the French defeat has been apportioned between Allemand and Willaumez by historians. Willaumez's hesitation in February left the French in a precarious position, in particular his reluctance to attack the squadron under Beresford, victory over which might have granted his fleet access to the Atlantic. Allemand, having inherited this situation, compounded the problem by attempting to fortify his fleet's anchorage, inviting attack, rather than effect an escape or counter-attack. Once he determined to remain at anchor in Aix Roads, a British assault became inevitable.

In Britain, Gambier's conduct has been criticised by historians ever since the battle, such as William Laird Clowes, who wrote in 1901 that "there can be no question that affair of Aix Road was mismanaged by the Admiralty at home and by the Admiral on the spot" and that "a great naval commander never loses an occasion to attack when conditions are favourable to him." In 2007 historian Noel Mostert wrote "Oh Nelson! Nelson, Nelson, where were you? Never could the absence of the man from a scene of action clearly designed for his drive and decision have been more painfully alive." In the same year, David Cordingly wrote that "The boldness of the attack . . . was comparable with the exploits of a Drake, de Ruyter and Nelson. And yet the action at Basque Roads has come to be regarded as a wasted opportunity, a bungled and confused affair." Perhaps the most damning response came from an enemy. Years later, Napoleon wrote to an English correspondent that Cochrane "could not only have destroyed [the French ships], . . . but he might and would have taken them out, had your admiral supported him as he ought to have done . . . The French admiral was a fool [imbécile], but yours was just as bad."


Order of Battle

The Battle of the Basque Roads was a major naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars, fought in the narrow Basque Roads at the mouth of the Charente River on the Biscaycoast of France. The battle, which lasted from 11-25 April 1809, was unusual in that it pitted a hastily-assembled squadron of small and unorthodox British Royal Navywarships, distantly supported by a larger fleet, against the main strength of the French Atlantic Fleet, the circumstances dictated by the cramped, shallow coastal waters in which the battle was fought. The battle is also notorious for its political aftermath in both Britain and France.

In February 1809 the French Atlantic Fleet, based at Brest was ordered to sail to the Caribbean to disrupt a British attack on Martinique. The fleet sailed on 22 February but was unable to escape British pursuit and four days latter anchored in the sheltered position of Basque Roads (or Aix Roads), under the batteries of the fortified Île-d'Aix. A detachment from the British Channel Fleet, commanded by Admiral Lord Gambier, had followed the French to the harbour and there enacted a close blockade. While Gambier debated what action to take, command of the French fleet was awarded to Contre-amiral Zacharie Allemand, who strengthened the fleet's defences and awaited a British attack. In Britain, First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Mulgrave, called on one of the nation's most popular, maverick young naval officers, Captain Lord Cochrane, to prepare an inshore squadron to attack the French.

Cochrane fitted out 24 fireships and explosion vessels and on the night of 11 April led them into the Roads, accompanied by a squadron of small vessels. The fireships caused panic among the French crews, who cut their anchor cables and drifted onto the rocks and shoals of the anchorage. When morning came, Cochrane found that almost the entire French fleet was at his mercy, and signaled to Gambier suggesting that if he would lead the British fleet into the Roads they could destroy the entire French force. Gambier did not respond, and eventually in frustration Cochrane led his own ship directly into combat. Unable to leave his subordinate unsupported, Gambier sent a small squadron of ships of the line to reinforce Cochrane, and on 12 April three French ships of the line, a frigate, and a large storeship were battered into surrender and then set on fire as damaged beyond repair.

Gambier then ordered the reinforcements to withdraw, leaving Cochrane again unsupported against the rest of the main French fleet which was gradually dragging itself off the shoals and into the relative safety of the Charente River. Cochrane renewed his attack on 13 April but was unable to cause any significant damage to the French ships as they threw stores and guns overboard to facilitate their escape. On the morning of 14 April Gambier directly ordered Cochrane to retire, turning command of the operation over to Captain George Wolfe. Cochrane reluctantly complied, and on 15 April sailed back to Britain with dispatches.

Wolfe renewed attacks on the remaining stranded ships of the French fleet over the next week, but with little effect. The battle concluded, Gambier sailed his fleet back to Britain. The engagement was a victory for the British, with five French ships destroyed and several others badly damaged, but there was much discontent in Britain, both among the Navy and the public, that a larger victory had been lost through over-caution. In the aftermath several French captains were subject to courts-martial, and one was shot for cowardice, while in Britain the acrimony between Cochrane and Gambier resulted in a dramatic court-martial of Gambier, in which he was sensationally acquitted.

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Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1812 – Launch of French Aréthuse, a 46-gun 18-pounder frigate of the French Navy.


The Aréthuse was a 46-gun 18-pounder frigate of the French Navy. She served during the Napoleonic Wars, taking part in a major single-ship action. Much later she took part in the conquest of Algeria, and ended her days as a coal depot in Brest.

Louis-Philippe_Crépin,_Combat_naval_en_vue_des_Îles_de_Loz,_7_février_1813_(19e_siècle).jpg
The battle between Aréthuse and Amelia on the shores of Guinea, 7 February 1813, by Louis-Philippe Crepin

Construction
Aréthuse was laid down at Nantes in 1807 and launched on 15 May 1812.

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Career
Cruise off West Africa, 1812-1813
Main article: Action of 7 February 1813
On 25 November 1812 the frigates Aréthuse (Captain Pierre Bouvet) and Rubis sailed from Nantes to intercept British trade off West Africa. In January, having captured a Portuguese ship, La Serra, they reached Cap-Vert. They also captured Little Belt, J. Wilson, master, sailing from Altea to London, Friends, Houston, master, sailing from Teneriffe to Belfast, and a Spanish brig sailing from Majorca to Puerto Rico. The French put the masters and crews on Delphina, a Portuguese they had captured and plundered. Delphina arrived at Pernambuco on 31 January.

On 27 January 1813, Aréthuse intercepted the brig HMS Daring (Lieutenant Pascoe) off Tamara (one of the Iles de Los off Guinea). Pascoe ran Daring aground and set fire to her to avoid her capture. The French managed to take part of her crew prisoner but released them against their parole and put them in a boat. Pascoe and those of his men who had escaped capture sailed to the Sierra Leone River, where they arrived the next day. There they reported the presence of the French frigates to HMS Amelia (Captain Frederick Paul Irby).

In the night of 5 February, a storm threw Rubis ashore, wrecking her. The same storm damaged Aréthuse' rudder. Rubis was abandoned and set afire, while Aréthuse effect her repairs.

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HMS Amelia in action with the French Frigate Aréthuse, 1813, by John Christian Schetky, 1852

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A dramatic night scene depiciting the battle between the French 'Arethuse', in the left foreground, and the British 'Amelia' near Guinea. The battle resulted in a stalemate, but both ships returned to port claiming victory. Inscription reads: 'Engagement between His Majesty's Ship Amelia carrying 48 Guns and 300 Men - and L'Arethuse, (French Frigate) carrying 48 Guns, and 380 Men, Off the Isle de Loss, on the Coast of Africa, On the Night of The 7th of February 1813 - The Rubus (Arethuse's Consort) carrying 48 Guns & 375 Men, having been in sight previous to the Action.' In 'The Royal Navy - a history' (Vol. 5, p521), William Laird Clowes lists 'Amelia's' guns as 24 and crew as 319 "men and boys" and 'Arethuse's' guns as 22 and crew as "about 340 men"

On 6 February, HMS Amelia, guided and reinforced by sailors from Daring, attacked Aréthuse. A furious, 4-hour night battle followed. Aréthuse and Amelia disabled each other by shooting at their sails and rigging. Eventually the ships parted, neither able to gain the upper hand, and both with heavy casualties: Amelia had 46 killed and 51 wounded; Aréthuse suffered over 20 killed and 88 wounded, and 30 round shot had struck her hull on the starboard side below the quarter deck.

Aréthuse returned to the wreck of Rubis to gather her crew, and returned to France. Soon afterwards Aréthuse captured the British privateer Cerberus, and arrived back in St Malo on 19 April having taken 15 prizes.

Later life and disposal
She took part in the Invasion of Algiers in 1830 as a transport. In 1833, she was razeed into a corvette. She was decommissioned in 1861 and used as a coal depot in Brest.




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Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1812 – Launch of HMS Briton, a 38-gun Leda-class fifth-rate frigate of the British Royal Navy's Leda class.


HMS Briton
was a 38-gun fifth-rate frigate of the British Royal Navy's Leda class. She was ordered on 28 September 1808 and her keel laid down at Chatham Dockyard in February 1810. Navy veteran Sir Thomas Staines was appointed her first captain on 7 May 1812 but did not join the ship until 17 June 1813 owing to his being at sea aboard HMS Hamadryad. After a period of cruising in the Bay of Biscay, the vessel set sail for South America where during the course of several missions she unexpectedly encountered the last member of the crew that had seized HMS Bounty from its captain Lieutenant William Bligh during the 1789 mutiny aboard the ship. With the coming of the Pax Britannica in 1815, Briton undertook various voyages before she was broken up in 1860.

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HMS Briton off Rio de Janeiro

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Career
Prize-taking
At the time of HMS Briton's launch, the United Kingdom was at war with the United States and France such that vessels of either country were considered legitimate prizes of war.

As a result, on 1 December 1812 Briton recaptured Wolfe's Cove, which the American privateer Grand Turk had captured a few weeks earlier as Wolfe's Cove was sailing from Quebec to England.

Then on 11 December 1812 Briton, together with the frigate HMS Andromache, took the American brig Leader from Boston bound for Bordeaux, France with a cargo of fish. Then on 10 December they took the French privateer San Souci from St Malo. San Souci of 14 guns, had a crew of 120 men. San Souci arrived at Plymouth on 20 December. Lloyd's List described her as being of 16 guns and having a crew of 70. It further reported that Andromache and Briton had chased Sans Souci for 12 hours before catching her. San Souci had been out six weeks and had captured two British vessels, Speculation, which had been sailing from Cork to Lisbon, and the South Seas whaler Frederick. Sans Souci had only captured Frederick after an hour-long engagement in which Frederick lost her mate killed, and had "Body" and three or four other crew severely wounded.[5] Sans Souci had on board the crew from Frederick.

On 17 December the two frigates captured the American brig Columbia, loaded with coffee and sugar en route from Philadelphia to Bordeaux, then the brig Stephen carrying cotton, potash and skins from New York to Bordeaux, shortly followed by the brig Exception on 20 December, underway from Philadelphia to Bordeaux loaded with cotton.

In January 1813 Briton and Andromache linked up with HMS Rota and on the 6th the three ships captured the brig Brutus travelling from New York to Bordeaux carrying cotton, coffee and sugar. After her boarding by a prize crew Brutus was not seen again, and it was assumed that she had either been recaptured or had foundered at sea.

On 3 April 1813 HMS Dispatch captured the Prussian vessel Enigheidt. Briton, HMS Belle Poule, and HMS Royalist shared by agreement. Belle Poule also captured the American schooner Napoleon. Belle Poule was in company with Briton and the hired armed cutter Fancy, with Dispatch and Royalist sharing by agreement.[8]

On 3 July Briton captured the 2-gun letter of marque American schooner Joel Barlow, off Bordeaux. She had been sailing from to Charleston to France at the time of her capture.

After a chase lasting seven hours, on 9 September 1813 Briton captured the fast sailing four-gun French privateer La Melance and her 26 man crew off Bordeaux.

On 13 December, Briton was in sight when the privateer Chance recaptured Watson, and so shared in the salvage money.

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Scale: 1:48. Plan showing the inboard profile for 'Leda' (1800), and later for 'Shannon' (1806), 'Leonidas' (1807), 'Surprise' (1812), 'Lacedemonian' (1812), 'Tenedos' (1812), 'Lively' (1804), 'Trinocomalee' (1817), 'Amphitrite' (1816), and 'Briton' (1812), all 38-gun fifth Rate, Frigates.

Convoy escort and other duties in the Pacific
On 31 December 1813 HMS Briton sailed from Spithead off the south coast of England for the East Indies as part of an escort for a convoy of 49 merchant ships. Briton left the flotilla to assist the disabled East Indiaman Fort William and sailed to Funchal on the Portuguese island of Madeira where the merchant vessel underwent necessary repairs. Eight days later the two ships set sail for Rio de Janeiro via Cape Verde, arriving on 20 March 1814.

After docking at Rio, together with HMS Tagus, under the command of Captain Philip Pipon, Briton received orders to proceed to the Pacific around Cape Horn where HMS Phoebe and HMS Cherub were hunting for the American frigate USS Essex, which had attacked British whalers in the area.

When Briton and Tagus arrived in Valparaiso on 21 May, the Phoebe and Cherub had already captured Essex following the Battle of Valparaiso. The four British ships left port on 26 June 1814 arriving at Paita further up the coast of Peru on 2 July. They left the same night and continued northwards close to the shore then anchored near the mouth of the Tumbes River on the border with Ecuador.

"It was on this place a boat belonging to the Phoebe was upset, which occasioned the death of Lieut. Jago, and the Purser, but whether they were drowned or eaten by the Alligators is uncertain. Several of these frightful creatures were seen next morning basking themselves in the sun, and both these gentlemen being good swimmers, one may be led to conclude they reached the shore only to die a more wretched death."
Galápagos Islands & Nuku Hiva
On finding nearby Isla de la Plata devoid of water, Briton and Tagus headed south to Salango Island where they anchored overnight before setting sail for the Galápagos Islands, arriving at Floreana Island, then known as Charles Island, on 25 July. The following day the two ships visited San Cristóbal Island (then Chatham Island), before proceeding to Santiago Island (then James Island). After a ten-day stay in the Galápagos and a 3,000-mile (4,800 km) journey westward, on 28 August 1814, the flotilla anchored off Nuku Hiva (then called Sir Henry Martyn's Island), one of the Marquesas Islands, which Commodore David Porter of Essex had previously claimed for the United States and renamed Madison Island after the then US President. Porter had built Fort Madison, Nuku Hiva and a villa on the island, which the natives destroyed after his ship left.

Before his departure, Sir Thomas Staines, with the consent of the local tribes excepting the "Typees" from the Tai Pi Valley, took possession of Nuku Hiva of behalf of the British Crown.

Pitcairn Islands

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HMS Briton at Pitcairn Island

Nearly three weeks later, on the return journey to Valparaiso, Briton and Tagus made landfall at the then little known island of Pitcairn.

"On the 17th September, 1814, at about half-past two o'clock in the morning, to my surprise and astonishment, land was discovered, both by the Briton and Tagus, and nearly at the same moment. The ships were hove to, and, on hailing the Briton, it was determined to continue in that situation until daylight in the morning, to ascertain the exact position of the land in view, and, according to circumstances, to reconnoitre (sic) it, if necessary. We were then, by our reckoning, in the latitude of about 24° 40' S., and longitude 130° 24' W., the land bearing S.S.E. five or six leagues. As in all the charts in our possession there was no land laid down in or near this longitude, we were extremely puzzled to make out what island it could be, for Pitcairn Island being, according to all accounts, in the longitude of 133° 24' W., we could not possibly imagine so great an error could have crept into our charts with respect to its situation."
— Captain Philip Pippin, HMS Tagus.
Unbeknownst to anyone aboard the two visiting ships, the only surviving mutineer from the Fletcher Christian led 1789 Mutiny on the Bounty, John Adams, remained alive on Pitcairn. Although Mayhew Folger aboard the American trading ship Topaz had paid a brief visit to the island in 1808 and the Admiralty in London were aware of the situation on the island from his subsequent report, neither Staines nor Pipin had been informed.

The Royal Marine Commander aboard Briton, Lieutenant John Shillibeer, wrote in his account of their arrival:

"At this moment I believe neither Captain Bligh of the Bounty, nor Christian, had entered any of our thoughts, and in waiting the approach of the strangers, we prepared to ask them some questions in the language of those people we had so recently left. They came —and for me to picture the wonder which was conspicuous in every countenance, at being hailed in perfect English, what was the name of the ship, and who commanded her, would be impossible—our surprize can alone be conceived. The Captain answered, and now a regular conversation commenced. He requested them to come alongside, and the reply was, " We have no boat hook to hold on by." "I will throw you a rope" said the Captain. "If you do we have nothing to make it fast to" was the answer. However, they at length came on board, exemplifying not the least fear, but their astonishment was unbounded."
The first man from Pitcairn to board Briton soon proved who the islanders were. His name, he said, was Thursday October Christian, the first born on the island and son of Fletcher Christian.

"He was then about twenty-five years of age, a fine young man, about six feet high, his hair deep black, his countenance open and interesting, of a brownish cast, but free from all that mixture of a reddish tint which prevails on the Pacific islands; his only dress was a piece of cloth round his loins, and a straw hat, ornamented with the black feathers of the domestic fowl ... we were glad to trace in his benevolent countenance all the features of an honest English face. I must confess, I could not survey his interesting person without feelings of tenderness and compassion."
From Christian and Adams, the visiting captains received an account of what had transpired since the mutiny, but as they had no instructions to take any action, they returned to Valparaiso, a journey that took about 25 days.

Return to the UK and later voyages
After three months cruising in the Pacific, on 12 February 1815, Briton and Tagus anchored off the Juan Fernández Islands to take on supplies. Briton remained in the Pacific until the end of April 1815 when she returned to Rio. At this time British merchants in Chile requested that a British warship continue to protect their interests and nominated Sir Thomas Staines as their preferred commander; instead he received orders to return home, arriving at Plymouth on 8 July 1815. Shortly afterwards Briton was put out of commission at Portsmouth as a result of cuts in the Royal Navy following Wellington's victory over Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo.


Crew list of HMS Britain c. 1813

In 1829, she transported Sir Henry Chamberlain, 1st Baronet to Portugal to take up his appointment as consul general.

On 10 August 1829, Briton left Portsmouth under the command of Capt. Hon. W. Gordon and returned to the same port on 13 August, departing again the following day. According to the Charleston Courier, on 2 June 1831 a bottle found off the coast of Florida at 25°52′N 80°9′W contained a note that read as follows:

"Current Bottle, No. 37. —This bottle has been thrown overboard, to determine the current, by Mr. W. H. Hale, of H.M.S. Briton. Whoever finds it, is requested to give intelligence of the same, in writing, to Mr. Harrison, the editor of the Hampshire Telegraph, at Portsmouth. —H.M.S. Briton, Captain the Hon. W. Gordon, Gulf of Mexico, 2nd February, 1830, from Tampico to England, in lat. 27° 50', lon. 84° 40'. Tortugas S. 18°, E. 230 miles."
Fate
Briton served as a convict ship from 1841 onwards. She became a target ship in February 1860. Breaking up was completed at Portsmouth on 18 September 1860.

Legacy
Along with Tagus, Briton featured on the 1988 15c postage stamp issued by the Pitcairn Island Post Office.
In November 2009, a log book from Briton sold at auction for £40,842.50



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Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1814 – Launch of USS Saratoga, named for the Battles of Saratoga, was a corvette built in Vergennes, Vermont, for service on Lake Champlain in the War of 1812


USS Saratoga, named for the Battles of Saratoga, was a corvette built in Vergennes, Vermont, for service on Lake Champlain in the War of 1812.[1]

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Service history
Saratoga was laid down on 7 March 1814, launched on 11 April 1814 and she was christened April 6, the day that Napoleon abdicated. She was a Corvette weighing 734 tons, 143' long with a beam of 36'6" and a depth of hold 12'6". She had a complement of 212 with an armament of eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pounder carronades and twelve 32-pounder carronades. The Saratoga began her service on Lake Champlain as England was turning her attention and resources from the European continent to North America. British strategy envisaged a series of amphibious raids along the American coast as a diversion to cover a lethal thrust south from Canada down the strategic and already historic Lake Champlain-Hudson River corridor.

However, the completion of Saratoga put the United States ahead in the naval construction race on Lake Champlain; and Sir George Prévost, the Governor General of Canada and top British military commander in America, felt that supremacy afloat was a prerequisite to a successful invasion of the United States through the state of New York. He, therefore, delayed the start of his campaign until new naval construction had tipped the balance back in his favor.

Meanwhile, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough, commander of American naval forces on the lake, took advantage of the edge which Saratoga had given him and sailed to the mouth of the Richelieu River. He proceeded to blockade the Richelieu for most of the following summer. Up the river at Ile aux Noix, the little British fleet, protected by shore batteries and by the river's narrow and tricky channel, waited while English shipwrights worked feverishly to complete HMS Confiance. The British launched the Confiance on 25 August 1814. She was a 36-gun frigate hastily fitted out for battle and the largest warship ever to sail on Lake Champlain.

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USS Saratoga and Eagle engage HMS Confiance at the Battle of Plattsburgh

Battle of Plattsburgh
Main article: Battle of Plattsburgh
Master Commandant Macdonough, commanding officer of Saratoga as well as of the other American forces on the lake, had sailed back south. He had proceeded around Cumberland Head, New York; and entered Plattsburg Bay. There, he deployed his ships across the mouth of the harbor in a strong defensive position where when the British fleet would attack them, they would be at a disadvantage of having to slowly and laboriously approach the line of American broadsides, against the wind and unable to bring most of their guns to bear.

As Master Commandant MacDonough awaited the arrival of the enemy, he dropped kedge anchors and arranged spring lines, which afforded his ships maximum maneuverability. He then had the crews practice turning their ships so that alternately starboard and port guns would face south.

During the construction race, crack British troops — veterans hardened in Wellington's bloody Peninsular Campaign — had been rushed from Spain to the St. Lawrence for the impending offensive. Before the end of August, the British Army had begun to march south along the western shore of Lake Champlain. Badly outnumbered, American ground forces withdrew before the English advance, crossed the Saranac River, and took prepared positions on the bluffs which overlook Plattsburg Bay. On the morning of 11 September, when Commodore George Downie led the British squadron around Cumberland Head, Macdonough was ready. As British brig, Linnet, approached firing range, she opened the action with a salvo toward Saratoga. All but one of the projectiles fell short; and that solid shot was all but spent as it landed on the American corvette, bounced across her deck, and smashed a wooden poultry cage freeing a gamecock. The indignant rooster took to his wings and landed in the rigging. Facing the British warships, the cock defiantly called out challenge to battle.

Macdonough, himself, aimed a long 24-pounder at the bow of Confiance, pulled the lanyard firing Saratoga's first round, and gave the signal, "close action." The shot cut the British flagship's anchor cable, ripped up her deck, and smashed her helm. Then, all the American ships opened fire.

Confiance's first broadside struck Saratoga from point blank range, and the American flagship reeled from the blow. Half of her men were felled by the shock; but most of the sailors picked themselves up, carried their dead and wounded comrades below, and returned to the fray. Since Confiance's green gunners failed to reset the elevation of their barrels, each of her subsequent volleys tended to be higher than its predecessor and, while shredding Saratoga's rigging, did little structural damage to the ship.

After almost two hours' fighting, Saratoga's last serviceable starboard gun, a carronade, broke loose from its carriage and hurtled down the main hatch. Macdonough then dropped a stern anchor; cut his bow cable; and, with the help of tars hauling on lines to kedge anchors, swung the ship around bringing her fresh, port, broadside guns to bear on the enemy.

The badly battered British flagship, with Downie and her first lieutenant dead, also attempted to wind ship but was unable to do so. Helpless to do further harm to her adversary, Confiance struck her colors.

Then, by pulling on her starboard kedge line, Saratoga's sailors turned the corvette's guns toward Linnet and opened fire. The British brig, although severely damaged and unable to move, gallantly kept up the fight for about an hour before surrendering. At that time, Finchand Chub, the other two relatively large warships in the British squadron, were already in American hands; so the surviving English gunboats fled toward Canada.

Macdonough's victory in Plattsburg Bay left the United States unchallenged on Lake Champlain and forced Prevost to retreat to Canada. This weakened the British position in negotiations at Ghent and enabled American commissioners to secure a favorable rather than a humiliating peace. It also helped to restore American morale after the recent burning of Washington, D.C.

After the war, Saratoga was laid up until sold at Whitehall, New York, in 1825.

Saratoga Passage, a body of water in Puget Sound, was named after the ship.


 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1861 – Launch of HMS Resistance, the second of two Defence-class ironclads built for the Royal Navy in the 1860s.


HMS Resistance
was the second of two Defence-class ironclads built for the Royal Navy in the 1860s. She was the first capital ship in the Royal Navy to be fitted with a ram and was given the nickname of Old Rammo. Resistance was initially assigned to the Channel Fleet upon commissioning, but was transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet in 1864, the first ironclad to be assigned to that fleet. She was rearmed in 1867 and became a guardship when recommissioned in 1869. The ship was reassigned to the Channel Fleet in 1873 before reverting to her former duties in 1877. Resistance was decommissioned in 1880 and was used for gunnery and torpedo trials beginning in 1885. The ship was sold for scrap in 1898 and foundered in 1899 en route to the breaker's yard. She was salvaged and later scrapped.

HMS_Defence_(1861)_after_1866.jpg

Design and description
The Defence-class ironclads were designed as smaller and cheaper versions of the Warrior-class armoured frigates. This meant that they could not fit the same powerful engines of the Warrior-class ships and were therefore 2 knots (3.7 km/h; 2.3 mph) slower and had far fewer guns. The naval architect Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, a future Constructor of the Navy, considered that, in terms of combat, a Defence-class ship was worth one quarter of a Warrior.

HMS Resistance was 280 feet (85.3 m) long between perpendiculars and 291 feet 4 inches (88.8 m) long overall. She had a beam of 54 feet 2 inches (16.51 m) and a draft of 26 feet 2 inches (8.0 m). The ship displaced 6,070 long tons (6,170 t) and had a ram in the shape of a plough, the first capital ship in the Royal Navy to be fitted with one.[1] The hull was subdivided by watertight transverse bulkheads into 92 compartments and had a double bottom underneath the engine and boiler rooms. Resistance was 128 feet 8 inches (39.2 m) shorter overall and displaced over 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) less than the Warrior-class ironclads.

Propulsion
The Defence-class ships had a single two-cylinder trunk steam engine made by John Penn and Sons driving a single 21-foot (6.4 m) propeller. Four rectangular boilers provided steam to the engine at a working pressure of 20 psi (138 kPa; 1 kgf/cm2). The engine produced a total of 2,329 indicated horsepower (1,737 kW). During sea trials on 25 August 1873, Resistance had a maximum speed of 11.4 knots (21.1 km/h; 13.1 mph). The ship carried 450 long tons (460 t) of coal, enough to steam 1,670 nautical miles (3,090 km; 1,920 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph).

The ironclad was ship rigged and had a sail area of 24,500 square feet (2,276 m2). The lower masts and bowsprit were made of iron to withstand the shock of ramming. Resistance could make about 10.5 knots (19.4 km/h; 12.1 mph) under sail and the funnel was semi-retractable to reduce wind resistance while under sail alone. The ship's propeller could be hoisted up into the stern of the ship to reduce drag while under sail.[8]She was re-rigged as a barque from September 1864 to April 1866 before returning to her original ship rig.

Armament
The armament of the Defence-class ships was intended to be 18 smoothbore, muzzle-loading 68-pounder guns, eight on each side on the main deck and one each fore and aft as chase guns on the upper deck, plus four rifled breech-loading 40-pounder guns as saluting guns. This was modified during construction to six rifled 110-pounder breech-loading guns, ten 68-pounders and two 32-pounder smoothbore guns, the only such weapons ever mounted in a British ironclad. Both breech-loading guns were new designs from Armstrong and much was hoped of them. Four of the 110-pounder guns were installed on the main deck amidships and the other two became chase guns; all of the 68-pounder guns were mounted on the main deck. Firing tests carried out in September 1861 against an armoured target, however, proved that the 110-pounder was inferior to the 68-pounder smoothbore gun in armour penetration and repeated incidents of breech explosions during the Battles for Shimonoseki and the Bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863–64 caused the navy to begin to withdraw the gun from service shortly afterwards.

The 7.9-inch (201 mm) solid shot of the 68-pounder gun weighed approximately 68 pounds (30.8 kg) while the gun itself weighed 10,640 pounds (4,826.2 kg). The gun had a muzzle velocity of 1,579 ft/s (481 m/s) and had a range of 3,200 yards (2,900 m) at an elevation of 12°. The 7-inch (178 mm) shell of the 110-pounder Armstrong breech-loader weighed 107–110 pounds (48.5–49.9 kg). It had a muzzle velocity of 1,150 ft/s (350 m/s) and, at an elevation of 11.25°, a maximum range of 4,000 yards (3,700 m). The 110-pounder gun weighed 9,520 pounds (4,318.2 kg) while the 40-pounder weighed 3,584 pounds (1,625.7 kg). All of the guns could fire both solid shot and explosive shells.

Resistance was rearmed during her 1867–68 refit with fourteen 7-inch and two 8-inch (203 mm) rifled muzzle-loading guns. The new guns were heavier so fewer could be carried. The shell of the 15-calibre 8-inch gun weighed 175 pounds (79.4 kg) while the gun itself weighed 9 long tons (9.1 t). It had a muzzle velocity of 1,410 ft/s (430 m/s) and was credited with the ability to penetrate a nominal 9.6 inches (244 mm) of wrought iron armour at the muzzle. The 16-calibre 7-inch gunweighed 6.5 long tons (6.6 t) and fired a 112 pounds (50.8 kg) shell. It was credited with the nominal ability to penetrate 7.7-inch (196 mm) armour.

Armour
HMS_Defence_(1861).jpg
Right elevation of HMS Defence from Brassey's Naval Annual, 1888; the shaded area shows the ship's armour

The Defence-class ships had a wrought iron armour belt, 4.5 inches (114 mm) thick, that covered 140 feet (42.7 m) amidships. The armour extended from upper deck level to 6 feet (1.8 m) below the waterline. 4.5-inch transverse bulkheads protected the guns on the main deck. The armour was backed by 18 inches (460 mm) of teak. The ends of the ship were left entirely unprotected which meant that the steering gear was very vulnerable. They were, however, sub-divided into many watertight compartments to minimize any flooding.

Construction and service
HMS Resistance was ordered on 14 December 1859 and laid down a week later by Westwood, Baillie at their shipyard in Cubitt Town, London. She was launched on 11 April 1861, commissioned in July 1862 and completed on 5 October at the cost of £258,120. After completion she served in the Channel Fleet until 1864 when she was transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet, the first British ironclad assigned to that fleet. In 1867 the ship was paid off in Portsmouth for refit and re-armament. Resistance recommissioned in 1869 as guardship in the River Mersey and served there until 1873 when she returned to the Channel Fleet. In 1877 the ship resumed her post as Mersey guardship until she was paid off in 1880 at Devonport.

In 1885 Resistance began to be used as a target for the testing of armour against the effects of torpedoes and gunfire. She was sold for scrap on 11 November 1898. She foundered in Holyhead Bay whilst under tow to the breakers on 4 March 1899 and was later raised and scrapped at Garston, Liverpool.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Resistance_(1861)
 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1908 – Launch of SMS Blücher, the last armored cruiser to be built by the Imperial German Navy,


SMS
Blücher
was the last armored cruiser built by the German Empire. She was designed to match what German intelligence incorrectly believed to be the specifications of the British Invincible-class battlecruisers. Blücher was larger than preceding armored cruisers and carried more heavy guns, but was unable to match the size and armament of the battlecruisers which replaced armored cruisers in the British Royal Navy and German Imperial Navy (Kaiserliche Marine). The ship was named after the Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher, the commander of Prussian forces at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

Blücher was built at the Kaiserliche Werft shipyard in Kiel between 1907 and 1909, and commissioned on 1 October 1909. The ship served in the I Scouting Group for most of her career, including the early portion of World War I. She took part in the operation to bombard Yarmouth and the raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby in 1914.

At the Battle of Dogger Bank on 24 January 1915, Blücher was slowed significantly after being hit by gunfire from the British battlecruiser squadron under the command of Vice Admiral David Beatty. Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper, the commander of the German squadron, decided to abandon Blücher to the pursuing enemy ships in order to save his more valuable battlecruisers. Under heavy fire from the British ships, she was sunk, and British destroyers began recovering the survivors. However, the destroyers withdrew when a German zeppelin began bombing them, mistaking the sinking Blücher for a British battlecruiser. The number of casualties is unknown, with figures ranging from 747 to around 1,000. Blücher was the only warship lost during the battle.

Bundesarchiv_DVM_10_Bild-23-61-11,_Großer_Kreuzer__SMS_Blücher_.jpg
SMS Blücher in 1912

Design
German armored cruisers—referred to as Große Kreuzer (large cruisers)—were designed for several tasks. The ships were designed to engage the reconnaissance forces of rival navies, as well as fight in the line of battle. The earliest armored cruiserFürst Bismarck—was rushed through production specifically to be deployed to China to assist in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Subsequent armored cruisers—with the exception of the two Scharnhorst-class ships—served with the fleet in the reconnaissance force.

On 26 May 1906, the Reichstag authorized funds for Blücher, along with the first two Nassau-class battleships. Though the ship would be much larger and more powerful than previous armored cruisers, Blücherretained that designation in an attempt to conceal its more powerful nature. The ship was ordered under the provisional name "E". Her design was influenced by the need to match the armored cruisers which Britain was known to be building at the time. The Germans expected these new British ships to be armed with six or eight 9.2 in (23 cm) guns. In response, the German navy approved a design with twelve 21 cm (8.3 in) guns in six twin turrets. This was significantly more firepower than that of the Scharnhorst class, which only carried eight 21 cm guns.

One week after the final decision was made to authorize construction of Blücher, the German naval attache obtained the actual details of the new British ships, called the Invincible class. In fact, HMS Invincible carried eight 30.5 cm (12.0 in) guns of the same type mounted on battleships. It was soon recognized that these ships were a new type of warship, which eventually came to be classified as the battlecruiser. When the details of the Invincible class came to light, it was too late to redesign Blücher, and there were no funds for a redesign, so work proceeded as scheduled Blücher was therefore arguably obsolete even before her construction started, and was rapidly surpassed by the German Navy's battlecruisers, of which the first (Von der Tann) was ordered in 1907. Despite this, Blücher was typically deployed with the German battlecruiser squadron.

General characteristics
Blücher was 161.1 m (528 ft 7 in) long at the waterline and 161.8 m (530 ft 10 in) long overall. The ship had a beam of 24.5 m (80 ft 5 in), and with the anti-torpedo nets mounted along the sides of the ship, the beam increased to 25.62 m (84 ft 1 in). Blücher had a draft of 8.84 m (29.0 ft) forward, but slightly less aft, at 8.56 m (28 ft 1 in). The ship displaced 15,842 t (15,592 long tons) at her designed weight, and up to 17,500 t (17,200 long tons) at maximum displacement. Her hull was constructed with both transverse and longitudinal steel frames, and she had 13 watertight compartments and a double bottom that ran for approximately 65% of the length of the hull.

Documents from the German naval archives generally indicate satisfaction with Blücher's minor pitch and gentle motion at sea. However, she suffered from severe roll, and with the rudder hard over, she heeled over up to 10° from the vertical and lost up to 55% of her speed. Blücher's metacentric height was 1.63 m (5 ft 4 in). The ship had a standard crew of 41 officers and 812 enlisted men, with an additional 14 officers and 62 sailors when she served as a squadron flagship. She carried a number of smaller vessels, including two picket boats, three barges, two launches, two yawls, and one dinghy.

Propulsion
Blücher was equipped with three vertical 4-cylinder triple expansion engines. Each engine drove a propeller, the center screw being 5.3 m (17 ft 5 in) in diameter, while the outer two screws were slightly larger, at 5.6 m (18 ft 4 in) in diameter. The ship had a single rudder with which to steer. The three engines were segregated in individual engine rooms. With six marine-type double boilers per room, the ship contained a total of 18 coal-fired boilers. The ship had a designed maximum speed of 24.5 knots (45.4 km/h; 28.2 mph), but during her trials, she achieved 25.4 knots (47.0 km/h; 29.2 mph). At a cruising speed of 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph), Blücher could steam for 6,600 nautical miles (12,200 km; 7,600 mi). At a speed of 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph), her range was cut down to 3,250 nmi (6,020 km; 3,740 mi). The ship was designed to carry 900 t (890 long tons) of coal, though voids in the hull could be used to expand the fuel supply to up to 2,510 t (2,470 long tons) of coal. Electrical power for the ship was supplied by six turbo-generators that provided up to 1,000 kilowatts, rated at 225 volts. The highest power ever achieved by a reciprocating engine warship was the 37,799 indicated horsepower (28,187 kW) produced by Blücher on her trials in 1909.

Armament

SMS_Blucher_line-drawing.png
Line-drawing of Blücher, showing the disposition of the main battery and armor protection

Blücher was equipped with twelve 21 cm (8.27 in) SK L/45[d] quick-firing guns in six twin turrets, one pair fore and one pair aft, and two pairs in wing turrets on either side of the superstructure. The guns were supplied with a total of 1,020 shells, or 85 rounds per gun. Each shell weighed 108 kg (238 lb), and was 61 cm (24 in) in length. The guns could be depressed to −5° and elevated to 30°, providing a maximum range of 19,100 m (20,900 yd). Their rate of fire was 4–5 rounds per minute.

The ship had a secondary battery of eight 15 cm (5.91 in) quick-firing guns mounted in MPL C/06 casemates, four centered amidships on either side of the vessel.[9] These guns could engage targets out to 13,500 m (14,800 yd). They were supplied with 1320 rounds, for 165 shells per gun, and had a sustained rate of fire of 5–7 rounds per minute. The shells were 45.3 kg (99.9 lb), and were loaded with a 13.7 kg (30.2 lb) RPC/12 propellant charge in a brass cartridge. The guns fired at a muzzle velocity of 835 m (2,740 ft) per second, and were expected to fire around 1,400 shells before they needed to be replaced.

Blücher was also armed with sixteen 8.8 cm (3.46 in) SK L/45 quick-firing guns, placed in both casemates and pivot mounts. Four of these guns were mounted in casemates near the bridge, four in casemates in the bow, another four in casemates at the stern, and the remaining four were mounted in pivot mounts in the rear superstructure. They were supplied with a total of 3,200 rounds, or 200 shells per gun, and could fire at a rate of 15 shells per minute. Their high explosive shells weighed 10 kg (22 lb), and were loaded with a 3 kg (6.6 lb) RPC/12 propellant charge. These guns had a life expectancy of around 7,000 rounds. The guns had a maximum range of 10,700 m (11,700 yd)

Blücher was also equipped with four 45 cm (18 in) torpedo tubes. One was placed in the bow, one in the stern, and the other two were placed on the broadside, all below the waterline. The ship carried a total of 11 torpedoes. The torpedoes carried a 110 kg (240 lb) warhead and had two speed settings, which affected the range. At 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph), the weapon had a range of 2,000 m (2,200 yd) and at 36 knots (67 km/h; 41 mph), the range was reduced to 1,500 m (1,600 yd).

Armor
As with other German capital ships of the period, Blücher was equipped with Krupp cemented armor. The armored deck was between 5–7 cm (2.0–2.8 in) in thickness; more important areas of the ship were protected with thicker armor, while less critical portions of the deck used the thinner armor. The armored belt was 18 cm (7.1 in) thick in the central portion of the ship where machinery, ammunition magazines, and other vitals were located, and tapered to 8 cm (3.1 in) in less important areas of the hull. The belt tapered down to zero at either end of the ship. Behind the entire length of the belt armor was an additional 3 cm (1.2 in) of teak. The armored belt was supplemented by a 3.5 cm (1.4 in) torpedo bulkhead, though this only ran between the forward and rear centerline gun turrets.

The forward conning tower was the most heavily armored part of the ship. Its sides were 25 cm (9.8 in) thick and it had a roof that was 8 cm thick. The rear conning tower was significantly less well armored, with a roof that was 3 cm thick and sides that were only 14 cm (5.5 in) thick. The central citadel of the ship was protected by 16 cm (6.3 in) armor. The main battery turrets were 8 cm thick in their roofs, and had 18 cm sides. The 15 cm turret casemates were protected by 14 cm of armor.

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SMS Blücher pre-war, circa 1913–1914

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Blücher during World War I

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Blücher underway

Bluecher_sinkend.jpg
The sinking Blücher rolls over on her side


 
Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
11 April 1914 – Launch of SMS Pillau, a light cruiser ordered by the Imperial Russian navy under the name Maraviev Amurskyy from the Schichau-Werke shipyard in Danzig


SMS Pillau
was a light cruiser ordered by the Imperial Russian navy under the name Maraviev Amurskyy from the Schichau-Werke shipyard in Danzig in 1913 and launched in April 1914. Following the outbreak of World War I, the ship was confiscated in August 1914 and renamed SMS Pillau in honor of the East Prussian port of Pillau (now Baltiysk, Russia). The ship was commissioned into the High Seas Fleet in December 1914. The lead ship of her class, she had one sister ship, Elbing. She was armed with a main battery of eight 15 cm SK L/45 guns and had a top speed of 27.5 kn (50.9 km/h; 31.6 mph).

Pillau spent the majority of her career in the II Scouting Group, and saw service in both the Baltic and North Seas. In August 1915, she participated in the Battle of the Gulf of Riga against the Russian Navy, and on 31 May – 1 June 1916, she saw significant action at the Battle of Jutland. She was hit by a large-caliber shell once in the engagement, but suffered only moderate damage. She assisted the badly damaged battlecruiserSMS Seydlitz reach port on 2 June after the conclusion of the battle. She also took part in the Second Battle of Heligoland Bight, though was not damaged in the engagement. Pillau was assigned to the planned, final operation of the High Seas Fleet in the closing weeks of the war, but a large scale mutiny forced it to be canceled.

After the end of the war, Pillau was ceded to Italy as a war prize in 1920. Renamed Bari, she was commissioned in the Regia Marina (Royal Navy) in January 1924. She was modified and rebuilt several times over the next two decades. In the early years of World War II, she provided gunfire support to Italian troops in several engagements in the Mediterranean. In 1943, she was slated to become an anti-aircraft defense ship, but while awaiting conversion, she was sunk by USAAF bombers in Livorno in June 1943. The wreck was partially scrapped by the Germans in 1944, and ultimately raised for scrapping in January 1948.

SMS_Pillau.jpg

Design
Main article: Pillau class cruiser
Pillau was 135.3 meters (444 ft) long overall and had a beam of 13.6 m (45 ft) and a draft of 5.98 m (19.6 ft) forward. She displaced 5,252 t (5,169 long tons; 5,789 short tons) at full combat load. Her propulsion system consisted of two sets of Marine steam turbines driving two 3.5-meter (11 ft) propellers. They were designed to give 30,000 shaft horsepower (22,000 kW). These were powered by six coal-fired Yarrow water-tube boilers, and four oil-fired Yarrow boilers. These gave the ship a top speed of 27.5 knots (50.9 km/h; 31.6 mph). Pillau carried 620 tonnes (610 long tons) of coal, and an additional 580 tonnes (570 long tons) of oil that gave her a range of approximately 4,300 nautical miles (8,000 km; 4,900 mi) at 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph). Pillau had a crew of twenty-one officers and 421 enlisted men.

The ship was armed with eight 15 cm SK L/45 guns in single pedestal mounts. Two were placed side by side forward on the forecastle, four were located amidships, two on either side, and two were side by side aft. She also carried four 5.2 cm SK L/55 anti-aircraft guns, though these were replaced with a pair of two 8.8 cm (3.5 in) SK L/45 anti-aircraft guns. She was also equipped with a pair of 50 cm (19.7 in) torpedo tubesmounted on the deck. She could also carry 120 mines. The conning tower had 75 mm (3.0 in) thick sides, and the deck was covered with up to 80 mm (3.1 in) thick armor plate.


The Pillau class of light cruisers was a pair of ships built in Germany just before the start of World War I. The class consisted of SMS Pillau and Elbing. The ships were initially ordered for the Imperial Russian Navy in 1912, and were built by the Schichau-Werke shipyard in Danzig. After the outbreak of World War I, however, the German Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy) confiscated the ships before they were completed. The ships were similar in design to other German light cruisers, although they lacked an armored belt. They were the first German light cruisers to be equipped with 15 cm SK L/45 guns, of which they carried eight. The two ships had a top speed of 27.5 knots (50.9 km/h; 31.6 mph).

Pillau and Elbing saw extensive service with the German High Seas Fleet. Pillau participated in the Battle of the Gulf of Riga in August 1915, and Elbing took part in the bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft in April 1916. The following month, both ships were heavily engaged in the Battle of Jutland on 31 May –1 June; there, Elbing scored the first hit of either side in the battle. Elbing was accidentally rammed and immobilized by the German battleship SMS Posen in the confused night fighting, and her crew were ultimately forced to scuttle her. Pillau continued to serve with the fleet until the end of the war. After the German defeat, she was ceded to Italy as a war prize and renamed Bari. She served in the Regia Marina (Royal Navy) until June 1943, when she was sunk in Livorno by USAAF bombers, and eventually broken up for scrap in 1948.

Service history
Pillau

Main article: SMS Pillau
Pillau spent the majority of her career in the II Scouting Group, and saw service in both the Baltic and North Seas. In August 1915, she participated in the Battle of the Gulf of Riga against the Russian Navy, and on 31 May – 1 June 1916, she saw significant action at the Battle of Jutland. She was hit by a large-caliber shell once in the engagement, but suffered only moderate damage. She assisted the badly damaged battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz reach port on 2 June after the conclusion of the battle. She also took part in the Second Battle of Heligoland Bight, though was not damaged in the engagement. Pillau was assigned to the planned, final operation of the High Seas Fleet in the closing weeks of the war, but a large scale mutiny in the fleet forced it to be canceled.

After the end of the war, Pillau was ceded to Italy as a war prize in 1920. Renamed Bari, she was commissioned in the Regia Marina (Royal Navy) in January 1924. She was modified and rebuilt several times over the next two decades. In the early years of World War II, she provided gunfire support to Italian troops in several engagements in the Mediterranean. In 1943, she was slated to become an anti-aircraft defense ship, but while awaiting conversion, she was sunk by USAAF bombers in Livorno in June 1943. The wreck was partially scrapped by the Germans in 1944, and ultimately raised for scrapping in January 1948.

Elbing
Main article: SMS Elbing
Elbing participated in only two major operations during her career. The first, the bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft, occurred in April 1916; there, she briefly engaged the British Harwich Force. A month later, she took part in the Battle of Jutland, where she scored the first hit of the engagement. She was heavily engaged in the confused fighting on the night of 31 May – 1 June, and shortly after midnight she was accidentally rammed by the battleship Posen, which tore a hole in the ship's hull. Flooding disabled the ship's engines and electrical generators, rendering her immobilized and without power. At around 02:00, a German torpedo boat took off most of her crew, and an hour later the remaining men scuttled the ship; they escaped in the ship's cutter and were later picked up by a Dutch steamer.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_Elbing
 
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